RACE TREASON: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
AMERICA’S BAN ON POLYGAMY
MARTHA M. ERTMAN*
Today’s ban on polygamy grew out of nineteenth century Americans’
view that Mormons committed two types of treason. First, antipolygamists
charged Mormons with political treason by establishing a separatist theocracy
in Utah. Second, they saw a social treason against the nation of White citizens
when Mormons adopted a supposedly barbaric marital form, one that was
natural for “Asiatic and African” people, but so unnatural for Whites as to
produce a new, degenerate species that threatened the project of white
supremacy. This Article reveals how both kinds of treason provided the
foundation of polygamy law through the discourse of legal, political and
medical “experts,” as well as, most vividly, cartoons of the day. This discourse
designated the overwhelmingly White Mormons as non-White to justify
depriving them of citizenship rights such as voting, holding office, and sitting
on juries. Paralleling the Mormon question to miscegenation disputes also
raging in the decades after the Civil War, the Article suggests two theoretical
perspectives to understand the “blackening” of Mormons. First, postcolonial
theorist Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism helps explain how designating
Mormons a subject race rendered their subjection inevitable. Second, Sir
Henry Maine’s 1864 observation that progressive societies move from status to
contract reveals the visceral defense of status embedded in antipolygamy
discourse. That defense of status may also have implicated other ways status
was giving way to contract, such as wage labor replacing slavery and the
partnership theory of marriage beginning to displace coverture. In either case,
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the Article contends, the racial foundations of American antipolygamy law
require us to rethink our own often reflexive condemnation of the practice. It
concludes by suggesting three questions to help us frame that inquiry, asking:
(1) whether we need to rethink this rarely-enforced ban; (2) whether current
antipolygamy law associates polygamy with barbarism, foreignness, and
people of color; and (3) whether it is coincidental that the plain language of the
Defense of Marriage Act prohibits both polygamy and same-sex marriage.

INTRODUCTION
[R]ace is at the center of all of American history.
— Ken Burns1

Many people think that American law bans polygamy to ensure
women’s equality and shield teenage girls from marrying old men. 2 But
that notion is largely wrong, at least if we interpret the relevant cases and
statutes in light of the intentions of the lawmakers who enacted four federal
statutes and the courts that upheld them in a line of cases that are still cited
as good law. They were hardly concerned with gender equality or protecting
children’s safety. Instead, the statutes went far beyond criminalizing
polygamy, depriving Mormon men and women of voting and other
citizenship rights to achieve the larger goal of preventing the traitorous
establishment of a separatist theocracy in Utah. Polygamy was merely a
symptom, fascinatingly salacious and easily ridiculed, of the pathology that
most Americans saw in Mormonism. However, knowing the treason-based
genesis of antipolygamy law need not force us to rethink the ban on
polygamy. Treason remains unlawful, making it a permissible justification
for the law today.
But race is also at the center of antipolygamy law, in a way that
forces us to rethink the ban itself. Many Americans, from the highest levels
of government to political cartoonists, viewed the Mormons’ political
treason as part of a larger, even more sinister offense that I call race treason.
1

See Interview by Mark Hall with Ken Burns, Documentarian, PBS (Jan. 21,
1997), available at http://www.pbs.org/jefferson/making/KB_00.htm.
2
See, e.g., Frances Raday, Secular Constitutionalism Vindicated, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2769, 2780–81 (2009); Dennis Wagner, After Raid, Other Polygamists Fear They’re
Next, ARIZ. REPUB., June 1, 2008, at 1. For a thorough response to these views, see Shayna
M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know about Polygamy is Wrong, 16 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 101 (2006).

2010]

Race Treason

289

According to this view, polygamy was natural for people of color, but
unnatural for White 3 Americans of Northern European descent. When
Whites engaged in this unnatural practice, antipolygamists contended, they
produced a “peculiar race.” 4 Antipolygamists linked this physical
degeneration to Mormons’ submission to despotism, reasoning that their
primitive form of government was common among supposedly backward
races. The Supreme Court accepted this argument in the leading
antipolygamy case, Reynolds v. United States, in which it rejected Mormon
claims that polygamy was protected as the free exercise of religion.5 The
Court reasoned that polygamy was “odious among the northern and western
nations of Europe,” “almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and
of African people,” and ultimately “fetters the people in stationary
despotism.”6 Well into the twentieth century, many Americans continued to
associate White Mormons with people of color, as evidenced by a
character’s quip in Jack London’s 1914 novel, “They ain’t whites; they’re
Mormons.”7
This racialization requires us to ask whether the polygamy ban
today continues to import those white supremacist values. In another
context, states criminalized cocaine and marijuana in the early twentieth
century to police and generally demonize Chinese and Mexican immigrants

3
This Article capitalizes “White” and “Black.” Stylistically, “White” should be
capitalized when it identifies a racial or ethnic group, since other group designations, such as
African American and Chinese, are capitalized. Substantively, capitalization recognizes
“White” as a category, contrary to the common tendency to leaving “white” lower-case
while other racial designations are capitalized. This small change invites the reader to see
how law treats Whiteness not as a neutral description of skin but as an aspiration or
entitlement, a norm to which other categories are compared. PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA 14 (2009).
Following Pascoe, this Article uses the lower case when discussing “white supremacy.” Id.
at 13.
4
Christine Talbot, Mormons, Polygamy and the American Body Politic: Contested
Citizenship, 1852-1890, at 335 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Michigan) (quoting SURGEON GENERAL’S OFFICE STATISTICAL REPORT 302 (1860)) (on file
with author).
5

98 U.S. 145 (1879).

6

Id. at 164, 165–66. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the link between polygamy
and barbarism as recently as 1946. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
7
JACK LONDON, THE STAR ROVER (Arcadia House 1950) (1914), quoted in
TERRYL L. GIVENS, THE VIPER ON THE HEARTH 135 (1997).
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as well as African Americans.8 By the late twentieth century, that policy,
though officially rejected, found expression in federal sentencing guidelines
that penalized offenses related to crack cocaine (more common in African
American communities), more harshly than powder cocaine (more common
in White communities). 9 There, as here, virulent racial motivations that
animated a legal rule requires us to examine the law`s current incarnation to
ensure it has shed the taint of its origin.
Casting overwhelmingly White Mormons as non-White required
rhetorical slights of hand. While Mormons’ distinctive theology and social
organization were politically unsettling in many ways, the practice of
polygamy justified the larger culture’s demotion of Mormons from full
citizenship on the grounds of racial inferiority. This Article tells the story of
race in polygamy law through the words of government actors and scholars,
using political cartoons to literally illustrate the widespread view of
Mormons as race traitors.
It then offers two theoretical frames through which to view
nineteenth century perceptions of polygamy as race treason: Orientalism
and jurisprudential insights about the tensions between status and contract.
Edward Said’s work on Orientalism offer some clues as to why cartoonists
might have portrayed Mormon polygamists as Black and Asian.10 Viewing
the discourse as Orientalist—essentially an “us/them” rubric that primarily
underpins colonialism—shows that antipolygamy discourse also spoke of
Mormon polygamy in “us/them” terms, treating polygamists not as people,
but as problems to be solved. The most valuable insight Orientalism offers
here is that framing a group as Oriental—an inherently backward, sensual,
and therefore subordinated Other—makes its subjection inevitable.11 Thus
8
DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER LAW: RACE AND THE WAR ON DRUGS
62–75 (2007); Michael M. Cohen, Jim Crow’s Drug War: Race, Coca-Cola and the
Southern Origins of Drug Prohibition, 12 SOUTHERN CULTURES 55, 56–57 (2006); PAUL
BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 44-45 (2009)..
9

Richard C. Boldt, Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 2245, 2321–22 (1992); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus
Criminality: Or Why the “War on Drugs” was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER, RACE &
JUST. 381 (2002).
10

EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979).

11
Id. at 3. For further discussion of Orientalist frameworks for understanding
popular and legal views of Mormons in the nineteenth century, see Christine Talbot, “Turkey
is in our Midst:” Orientalism and Contagion in Nineteenth Century Anti-Mormonism, 8 J.L.
& FAM. STUD. 363 (2006). For further discussion of Orientalism as applied to legal issues
more generally, see Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002).
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the public imagination’s construction of Mormons as members of subject
racial groups (Asian and Black, mainly) played a crucial role in subjecting
Mormons to federal control.12
An alternative, or perhaps complementary, interpretation turns on
the famous 1864 assertion of English comparative jurist Sir Henry Maine
that “the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a
movement from Status to Contract.” 13 This insight situates seismic
nineteenth century changes—such as slavery incrementally giving way to
wage labor and coverture eroding through reforms like the Married
Women’s Property Acts—as part of a larger, progressive transition away
from family and toward individuals as the organizing principles of legal
regulation.14
Applying Henry Maine’s insight to the polygamy debates reveals a
complex tension between status and contract. Both sides raised issues of
consent, a foundational component of contractualism. Antipolygamists
contended that no sane White woman would consent to polygamy, and
Mormons countered that the federal government should not coerce people
into monogamy when their religious beliefs dictated that they practice
polygamy. Similarly, both forms of marriage assigned men and women
rights and responsibilities based on their status. Status-based rules excluded
monogamous wives from aspects of public life such as the practice of law.15
Along the same lines, the “Patriarchal Principle,” as the Mormons called
polygamy, reaffirmed the status-based authority of fathers and husbands
that the rest of America was slowly leaving behind.16 In short, status and
contract played key roles in both monogamy and polygamy.
However, we can see monogamy as substantively more contractual,
and procedurally more status-oriented. Polygamy, conversely, was
substantively grounded in status, but procedurally more contractual.
Procedure here has both micro and macro aspects. By micro, I mean to
designate individuals’ entry and exit from marriage. Macro, in contrast,
refers to broader levels of regulation. Focusing on the micro or individual,
Mormon polygamy was contractual in its liberal divorce rules. At the macro
12

See infra Part III.A.

13

HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (3d Am. ed. 1888).

14

Id. at 163.

15

See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).

16
SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 3 (2002).

AND
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or general level, it offered a way to “contract out” of monogamy into an
alternative marital regime. This contractualism, I argue, played a central
role in antipolygamy law. Polygamy constituted, for the rest of the nation,
the most obvious evidence of how wrongheaded Mormons were to
“contract out” of the nineteenth century American polity by establishing a
separatist culture and economy.
This Article uses political cartoons of the day to demonstrate how
viscerally the American polity fought against the Mormons’ attempt at
private ordering, deploying images of domestic and governmental disorder
to rail against the chaotic consequences of abandoning status in marriage. In
the cartoons, race and gender served as shorthand for status, the notion of
assigned, inherent and unchanging roles. Because marriage was deeply
raced and gendered, and not coincidentally defined citizenship, 17
antipolygamists’ equation of polygamy with Asian and Black foreignness
reaffirmed the centrality of Whiteness to full citizenship. Equating
Whiteness with citizenship mattered enormously in the time of which we
speak. Abolitionists and Freedmen pushed hard for full civic membership
for the freed slaves. The cartoons here oppose it, using polygamy to beat
back African Americans’ claims to civil membership in the wake of the
Civil War.18
This Article critically reads the historical record to uncover these
themes. Part I sets the stage by elaborating the common nineteenth century
view of Mormons as political traitors.19 Part II then documents the related
charge of race treason reflected in antipolygamy rhetoric in politics,
medicine, the academy, and political cartoons. Part III tries to make sense
of these remarkable facts by situating them within the theoretical
frameworks of Orientalism and the move from status to contract. Finally,
having demonstrated the dubious provenance of American polygamy law,
17
Citizenship can both be literal, as in being an American citizen, and cultural, as
in being one holding rights and duties of citizenship such as voting, holding office, and
entering contracts. This Article generally uses “citizenship” in this second sense, sometimes
using the term “civic membership” to capture participation in the polity. For fuller
discussions of ways that race and marriage influenced both kinds of citizenship, see NANCY
F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 117 (2000), and ARIELA
GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA 6 (2008).
18

Kelly Elizabeth Phipps, Note, Marriage and Redemption: Mormon Polygamy n
the Congressional Imagination, 1862-1887, 95 VA. L. REV. 435, 441, 474 (2009).
19

For a full articulation of the association between Mormon polygamy and
treason, including other historical details from Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 154
(1879), see Martha M. Ertman, The Story of Reynolds v. United States: Federal “Hell
Hounds” Punishing Mormon Treason, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 51 (Carol Sanger ed., 2007).
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the Article ends with Part IV posing three questions that could structure
further inquiry. First, why rethink a ban that affects few people, due to both
rarity of prosecution and its practice by isolated religious sects? Second, do
we still associate plural marriage with barbarism, foreignness, and people of
color? Third and finally, is it a coincidence that the plain language of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) bans both polygamy and same-sex
marriage?20
I. MORMON POLYGAMY AS TREASON
In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the first of
four statutes that Congress passed to force Mormons to abandon the
practice of polygamy.21 First Amendment scholars have debated Reynolds’
division between permissible limits on conduct and impermissible limits on
belief.22 But what was so bad about that conduct?
The Court justified criminalizing Mormon polygamy in two
passages that link polygamy first to “Asiatic and African people,” then to
“stationary despotism.”23 But it is hard to fathom why the Court cared who
else, other than the Mormons, practiced polygamy, or why all three
branches of government (and indeed virtually the entire nation) cared so
much about a religious community in a remote part of the country. This Part
mines the historical record to answer these questions, concluding that the
federal government, and most Americans, were more concerned with the
political and racial implications of Mormon polygamy than with the
practice of polygamy per se. These concerns are best described as a view of
Mormon polygamy as political and race treason.
20

Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 109-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2009)) (“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife . . . .”).
21

98 U.S. 145 (1879).

22

See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1980); Ray J. Davis, Plural Marriage and
Religious Freedom: The Impact of Reynolds v. United States, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 287 (1973);
Donald L. Drakeman, Reynolds v. United States: The Historical Construction of
Constitutional Reality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 697 (2004); Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence W. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for
Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994); Marci A. Hamilton, The
Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A
Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 713
(1993).
23

Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164, 165–66.
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Treason means different things in different contexts. In ordinary
speech, treason is as much a “violation of allegiance toward one’s sovereign
or country” as “waging war against” it.24 Constitutionally, however, treason
is narrowly defined as encompassing only the acts of “[l]evying War
against [the United States] or in adhering to their Enemies, [or] giving them
Aid and Comfort.” 25 This Part reveals the underpinning for claims that
Mormons committed both kinds of treason.
Like the Supreme Court’s language in Reynolds, the rise of
increasingly draconian federal polygamy legislation shows that Congress’s
target was much larger than plural marriage. The statutes, for example,
barred people who practiced or believed in these unions from jury service,
and barred actual polygamists from holding public office and from voting.26

24

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1290 (2d college ed. 1985).

25

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.

26

Edmunds Act, Ch 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882) (repealed 1983). The first statute was
the Morill Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (repealed 1910). It proved hard to
enforce, due to difficulties establishing proof of a second marriage without public or church
records, uncooperative Mormon witnesses, and Mormon control of the Utah judiciary.
GORDON, supra note 16, at 97, 111. In 1874, Congress passed the Poland Act, which
imposed federal control over the Utah judiciary by limiting probate court jurisdiction (which
Mormons had expanded to include all civil cases), and also empowered federal marshals to
serve process for the district and supreme courts. Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 469, 18 Stat. 253
(repealed). The Poland Act also empowered the U.S. Attorney to prosecute all criminal cases
in all courts and mandated jury selection procedures. Id. Reynolds was brought right after the
Poland Act closed the loopholes that allowed polygamists to evade prosecution under the
Morrill Act, and was a test case tailored to challenge the Morrill Act’s constitutionality.
Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145. Since Mormons polygamy persisted after the Supreme Court issued
its opinion in Reynolds, in 1882 Congress passed the Edmunds Act, which imposed civil
disabilities on polygamists and facilitated polygamy prosecutions by creating a new offense,
unlawful cohabitation, which did not require proof of marriage. Edmunds Act, supra. This
new offense was punishable by a maximum fine of $300 or six months in prison. Id. The
Edmunds Act also authorized courts to exclude prospective jurors for either practicing or
believing in polygamy, barred polygamists from voting or holding public office, and created
a federal election commission to oversee Utah elections. Id. Congress struck the fatal blow to
polygamy in Utah when it passed the Edmunds-Tucker Act in 1887. Edmunds-Tucker Act,
ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887) (repealed 1978). This law eliminated evidentiary obstacles in
polygamy prosecutions, allowed the state to compel wives to testify against their
polygamous husbands, allowed adultery prosecutions to be instituted by the state rather than
the spouse, required registration of every “ceremony of marriage, or in the nature of a
marriage ceremony,” federalized the probate courts, disinherited the children of polygamists,
re-established dower to assert the power of the first wife in a plural marriage,
disenfranchised Utah woman, and placed schools, districting, and the territorial militia
known as the Nauvoo Legion under federal control. Id. But most importantly, the EdmundTuckers Act reaffirmed the Morrill Act’s revocation of the Mormon Church’s corporate
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Moreover, they designated the children of such unions illegitimate, seized
the Church’s property, and revoked the Church’s corporate charter. 27
President Hayes similarly framed the so-called Mormon Question as
political. The day he denied George Reynolds’ request for clemency, his
diary entry unequivocally condemned all aspects of Mormon governance in
Utah, listing polygamy as but one of many “evils” sanctioned by the
Church:
Now the Territory is virtually under the theocratic government of
the Mormon Church. . . . Polygamy and every other evil
sanctioned by the Church is safe. . . . Mormonism as a sectarian
idea is nothing; but as a system of government it is our duty to
deal with it as an enemy to our institutions and its supporters and
leaders as criminals.28

In short, the legal doctrines that ban polygamy today are artifacts of a
nineteenth century view that polygamy was problematic primarily because
it was a symptom of a much greater offense: the establishment of a
separatist theocracy.
The Mormons fiercely resisted the federal government’s efforts to
force them to abandon political, economic and social control of Utah, as
well as polygamy. Only in 1890, when the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the last statute, which directed the Attorney General to
seize the Church’s assets and wind down its affairs, did the Church leaders
give in.29
status and directed the Attorney General to wind up the corporation’s affairs and seize
Church property. Id.
27

Id.

28
CHARLES RICHARD WILLIAMS, THE LIFE OF RUTHERFORD BURCHARD HAYES 225
& n.1 (1914) (emphasis added).
29

Late Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). The
Church gradually rejected polygamy, beginning with an equivocal statement by Church
President Wilford Woodruff known as the 1890 Manifesto. CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF THE
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, Official Declaration No. 1, in DOCTRINE & COVENANTS (1890),
available at http://scriptures.lds.org/en/od/1 [hereinafter Official Declaration No. 1].
Woodruff’s public announcement of the Church’s changed position on polygamy differs
from other divine revelations that Church leaders claimed to have received, in that it began,
“To Whom It May Concern.” The revelation dictating polygamy, in contrast, begins,
“Verily, thus saith the Lord.” Compare Official Declaration No. 1, supra, with CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS, DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 132 (1843), available
at http://scriptures.lds.org/en/dc/132. Moreover, while other revelations command obedience
to God’s will, the 1890 Manifesto merely declares President Woodruff’s intent to “use my
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A. Mormons Questionable from the Outset
The Mormon Question engaged the nation for the second half of the
nineteenth century. 30 When Mormon president Brigham Young died in
1877, the New York Times published a lengthy front page obituary, and
other papers followed suit. 31 Throughout the forty-year struggle between
Mormons and the federal government over polygamy, newspapers in New
York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Cincinnati and other cities reported on
the issue.32 Magazines such as Puck, The Wasp, and The Judge published
cartoons lampooning Mormon polygamy, and an entire genre of
melodramatic fiction engaged readers in lurid tales of polygamy’s
excesses.33 When Brigham Young’s sixteenth wife, Ann Eliza Young, left
him and sued for divorce, she addressed rapt audiences across the nation,

influence” to have Mormons obey federal law and advise them not to enter plural marriage.
Official Declaration No. 1, supra. When the Manifesto was issued, the Salt Lake Tribune
dismissed it as “nothing more than the personal advice of a visionary old man,” a view
echoed by one scholar who described it as “milky advice” rather than “meaty revelation.”
BRIAN C. HALES, MODERN POLYGAMY AND MORMON FUNDAMENTALISM: THE GENERATIONS
AFTER THE MANIFESTO 53, 57 (2006). Given the centrality of plural marriage for Mormon
culture and theology, it is hardly surprising that some Mormons continued to enter plural
marriages after 1890, generally with either Church approval or Church officials looking the
other way. Id. at 58, 61–63; GORDON, supra note 16, at 235. Although the Utah State
Constitution included a provision rejecting polygamy in order to obtain statehood in 1896,
the Church did not unequivocally renounce plural marriage until 1904. In the wake of twoand-a-half years of Senate hearings that revealed the continued practice of polygamy among
Mormons, the Church issued the 1904 Manifesto, which explicitly prohibited plural
marriages, and threatened those who entered or solemnized them with excommunication. 4
MESSAGES OF THE FIRST PRESIDENCY, 1901-1915 at 84–95 (James R. Clark ed., 1970). In
1908, the Church began publishing the 1890 and 1904 Manifestos along with its other
scriptures. Today, Mormons commonly interpret the 1890 Manifesto as God withdrawing the
command to practice polygamy, and the 1904 Manifesto as withdrawing permission to
practice it. HALES, supra note 29, at 84.
30

GORDON, supra note 16, at 3, 14, 29–58.

31

Death of Brigham Young, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1877, at 1–2. The New York
Times obituary occupied a full column of the front page, and nearly two full columns of page
two. For a partial list of media from San Francisco, Chicago, and other cities reporting
Young’s death, see Gary L. Bunker & Davis Bitton, The Death of Brigham Young: Occasion
for Satire, 54 UTAH HIST. Q. 358, 360 (1986). For the Mormon Newspaper’s obituary of
Young, see Obituary, DESERET EVENING NEWS, Aug. 30, 1877, at 2.
32

See, e.g., infra note 85 and accompanying text.

33

GORDON, supra note 16, at 3, 14, 29–58.
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including President Grant, his wife, and numerous members of Congress.34
Although the salacious details of polygamous life informed much
discussion of the Mormon Question, 35 this Article argues that the
underlying controversy was more concerned with politics than sexual
improprieties.
B. Mormon Treason
Mormons were infamous almost from 1830, when Joseph Smith
founded the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Its followers
quickly became known as Mormons after their sacred text, The Book of
Mormon.36 Two elements distinguished this new religion from the outset.
First, Smith claimed ongoing, direct communication with God directing him
to reform Christianity by re-establishing Old Testament rules.37 Second, he
promptly amplified the power of these divine directives by
excommunicating those outside his family who initially testified that they,
too, were present when God dictated the Book of Mormon.38 More startling
still, Smith crowned himself “king” and ran for president in 1844 under a
platform he called “theo-democracy.”39
34

Id. at 112 (describing Ann Eliza Young’s lecture tour as “one of the most
spectacularly successful lecture tours of the nineteenth century”). After the tour, she
published an expose of her experiences among the Mormons. ANN ELIZA YOUNG, WIFE NO.
19, OR A LIFE IN BONDAGE, BEING A COMPLETE EXPOSE OF MORMONISM, AND REVEALING THE
SORROWS, SACRIFICES AND SUFFERINGS OF WOMEN IN POLYGAMY (Kessinger Publishing
2003) (1875).
35

Abolitionist literature similarly detailed, often in a salacious manner, the sexual
degradations suffered by slave women. AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT:
WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 27 (1998).
On ways that illicit sex serves as both a catalyst and bar to extension of marriage, see Ariela
R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756
(2006).
36

GORDON, supra note 16, at 19, 22, 91.

37
KATHRYN M. DAYNES, MORE WIVES THAN ONE: TRANSFORMATION
MORMON MARRIAGE SYSTEM, 1840-1910, at 23–24 (2001).
38

OF THE

Id.

39
GORDON, supra note 16, at 23. Under “theo-democracy” God instructed Joseph
Smith of the proper course, which he then relayed to the people he governed. Some evidence
suggests that Smith’s title was King of the Kingom of Heaven, or King and Ruler over Israel.
MICHAEL MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 113 (2d ed. 2006); GORDON,
supra note 16, at 265 n. 41.
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What might have passed unnoticed as a crackpot gesture in one of
the many new religious movements cropping up in the early nineteenth
century instead attracted considerable enmity. Neither Shakers, who
practiced gender equality and celibacy, nor Oneida perfectionists, who
practiced a form of non-monogamy they called “complex marriage,”
exercised the Mormons’ economic or political clout.40 Mormons’ intense
evangelism, coupled with doctrines under which Church members ceded
control of their everyday lives as well as their property to the Church, made
them a large and ever-expanding religious community that took over towns
they occupied. 41 Their political, economic, and social insularity took
various forms, including bloc voting, forming their own militia, and doing
business only with other Mormons.42
Anti-Mormon sentiment drove them to Utah in the late 1840s,
where they hoped to implement their separatist theology.43 When they tried
to indelibly mark the Territory as Mormon by asking Congress to name it
“Deseret” after a word in the Book of Mormon meaning “honeybee,”
Congress refused.44 Congress also significantly cut it down from the size
requested (which would have represented fully one sixth of the United
States).45 Mormons did retain control over the Territory’s economy through
institutions such as the Zion’s Cooperative Mercantile Institution (ZCMI), a
Church-controlled department store that paid employees in company scrip
that ZCMI sellers honored, keeping currency within the Mormon
40
LAWRENCE FOSTER, RELIGION AND SEXUALITY: THREE AMERICAN COMMUNAL
EXPERIENCES OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1981).
41

GORDON, supra note 16, at 24.

42
The New York Times article at Brigham Young’s death described the complete
control of Church leaders: “Every man had a vote, but all were supposed to vote by direction
and counsel of the Lord, through His prophet, Brigham Young. Socially, the Mormons were
no better off than a horde of peasants, bound to obey the bidding of suzerain.” Death of
Brigham Young, supra note 31, at 2. For a discussion of Mormon resistance to Joseph
Smith’s ever-increasing powers, see DAYNES, supra note 37, at 33. The Mormons who
remained in the Church justified their separatism with a millennial theology that following
their church doctrines would reform Christianity in preparation for the soon-to-occur Second
Coming. Id. at 21.
43

GORDON, supra note 16, at 26
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Id.
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EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 1830–1900, at 213
(1988).
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community. 46 Similarly, the Church experimented with communal living
through a form of Christian communism it called the United Order, under
which members deeded their property over to the Order, and received back
the right to use it as long as they returned any surplus to the Order.47
Mormon leaders also controlled all three branches of the Territorial
government. In addition to controlling the territorial courts, the Church
established separate Church courts for disputes among Mormons. 48 The
Mormon-controlled legislature, for its part, tailored legislation to conform
to Mormon doctrine. One statute provided that church decisions regarding
marriage “could not be legally questioned,” 49 another implemented the
Mormon Church’s antipathy to legalism by rejecting common law because
equitable principles aligned better with Mormon doctrine, and a third statute
deprived attorneys of the right to collect their fees to discourage the filing
of legal claims. 50 In the Executive Branch, Mormon president Brigham
Young presided as Governor.51 As Mark Twain quipped, “the petrified truth
is that Utah is an absolute monarchy and Brigham Young is king.”52
The federal government engaged in a prolonged campaign against
this separatism’. The military aspect of that campaign concluded with
Young giving up the governorship in 1858 after losing an armed conflict
with federal troops called the Mormon War. 53 President Buchanan
dispatched three thousand troops to Utah in the summer of 1857 to quell
Utah’s rebellion. 54 On September 14, 1857, Young tried to bar federal
troops from the Territory, declaring,
46

Utah, like much of the west, faced perennial shortages in U.S. currency in the
nineteenth century. Leonard J. Arrington, Banking Enterprises in Utah, 1847-1880, 29 BUS.
HIST. REV. 312 (1955); Leonard J. Arrington, The Mormon Tithing House: A Frontier
Business Institution, 28 BUS. HIST. REV. 24 (1954).
47
P.A.M. Taylor & Leonard J. Arrington, Religion and Planning in the Far West:
The First Generation of Mormons in Utah, 11 ECON. HIST. REV. 71, 72–73 (1958).
48

FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 45, at 25-47.
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GORDON, supra note 16, at 26.
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Id. at 26, 74; FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 45, at 218.
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Id. at 26.
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RICHARD WHITE, IT’S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN: A NEW
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GORDON, supra note 16, at 60–62.
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This people are free; they are not in bondage to any government
on God’s footstool. We have transgressed no law . . . as for any
nation’s coming to destroy this people, GOD ALMIGHTY
BEING MY HELPER, THEY CANNOT COME HERE.”55

Two weeks later, on September 29, Young reiterated his resistance
to federal troops by writing to a U.S. Army Colonel, “By virtue of the
authority thus invested in me [as governor of Utah], I have issued and
forwarded to you a copy of my proclamation forbidding the entrance of
armed forces into this territory. This you have disregarded. I now further
direct that you retire forthwith from the territory.”56 Brigham Young put
some of his threats into action.
The Nauvoo Legion burned federal supply trains and two federal
forts on their way to Utah.57 Tensions escalated further after the Mountain
Meadows Massacre, in which Mormons and Indians murdered some 127
Arkansans traveling through Utah in September 1857. 58 The federal
government placed Utah under martial law, and only the onset of a severe
winter prevented federal troops from battling the Mormon army of 2500.59
By acting as if he led an independent country, Young posed a secessionist
threat to the Union. 60 In the late 1850s, these threats were particularly
powerful as tensions between the North and South escalated in the build up
to the Civil War. Moreover, access to the western trails running through
Utah gave Young the power to significantly limit access to the West
Coast.61 The federal government responded to the Mormons’ secessionist
threat by indicting Young and sixty followers for treason.62
55
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While it was not the first treason prosecution against Mormons, it
was the most firmly grounded in law. Mormons could reasonably claim
self-defense in Missouri’s and Illinois’s 1838 and 1844 treason prosecutions
against Mormon founder Joseph Smith, but even the official history of the
Mormon Church concedes that “technically speaking,” the Mormons levied
war against the United States in the Mormon War.63 President Buchanan
pardoned the defendants in 1858, on the condition that Young and his
followers “submit themselves to the authority of the federal government.”64
While the new, non-Mormon governor declared in June 1858 “peace is
restored to our Territory,”65 the truce was fragile. The continued hostilities
were evident in Young’s declaration after signing the pardon: “If a man
comes from the moon and says he will pardon me for kicking him in the
moon yesterday, I don’t care about it. I’ll accept of his pardon.”66
The taint of treason pervaded discussions of Mormon polygamy in
all three branches of government. Another “treason and rebellion”
prosecution occurred in 1870, involving people close to George Reynolds,
who would be the defendant in the case testing the constitutionality of the
federal criminalization of bigamy through the Morrill Act. 67 Mormons
resisted the federally appointed governor’s challenge to their control of the
Nauvoo Legion in an action known as the Wooden Gun Rebellion.68 While
Reynolds himself escaped prosecution, eight Nauvoo Legion officers from
Reynolds’s regiment were charged with “treason and rebellion.”69 Again, in
1871, federal prosecutors in Idaho sought to charge Brigham Young with
treason for “lewd and lascivious cohabitation,” in violation of a Territorial
63

Id. In Missouri, defendants escaped (possibly with the cooperation of their
captors). 4 B.H. ROBERTS, COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS 411 (photo. reprint 1965) (1957). See also NELS ANDERSON, DESERT
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his arrest. Id.
64
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statute.70 Judge McKean explicitly framed the prosecution as vanquishing
“polygamic theocracy,” declaring:
While the case at the bar is called “The People versus Brigham
Young,” its other and real title is “Federal Authority versus
Polygamic Theocracy.” The government of the United States,
founded upon a written constitution, finds within its jurisdiction
another government—claiming to come from God . . . whose
policies and practices, are, in grave particulars, at variance with
its own. The one government arrests the other, in the person of its
chief, and arraigns it at this bar. A system is on trial in the person
of Brigham Young. Let all concerned keep this fact constantly in
view; and let that government rule with out rival which shall
prove to be in the right.71

Similarly, in 1886, seven years after Reynolds lost in the Supreme Court,
and a year before Congress passed its fourth and final antipolygamy statute,
Mormon leader John W. Taylor was charged in Idaho Territory with
inciting rebellion against the laws of the United States by encouraging
Mormons to practice polygamy.72
The other branches of government similarly framed the Mormon
Question as political treason. One legislator, Vermont Senator George
Edmunds, described polygamy as a “crime against the political institutions
of our country.”73 Even Stephen A. Douglas, legendary supporter of states’
rights, denounced Mormons as “a pestiferous disgusting cancer . . . alien
enemies and outlaws engaging in treasonable, disgusting and bestial
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at 1. According to the Deseret News, “the Judge said that a man had no right to recognize in
the covenants or laws of any organization a higher allegiance than that which he owed to the
government. Treason consisted in an attempt to overthrow the laws of the government. The
defendant, in refusing to promise obedience to those laws, sought to overthrow them.” Id.
73

285.

George F. Edmunds, Political Aspects of Mormonism, HARPER’S, Jan. 1881, at

2010]

Race Treason

303

practices.” 74 Speaking for the Executive Branch in 1881, President
Garfield’s Inaugural Address asserted that the Mormon Church should not
“be safely permitted to usurp in the smallest degree the functions and
powers of the National Government.”75
What kept the federal government from eradicating Mormon
separatism through treason prosecutions? Maybe, in light of the Civil War,
the federal government wanted to consolidate its power and the Union
without directly raising the thorny issues of local control just barely
resolved through that war. Maybe polygamy was winnable, while
jurisdictional, factual, or doctrinal barriers weakened a treason claim.76 In
any case, the federal decision to prosecute Mormons for polygamy rather
than treason does not eradicate the role of treason in the case.77
That close link between polygamy and political treason held far
beyond the halls of government. The following materials use political
cartoons to demonstrate the interweaving of political and racial treason in
popular discourse, explicating the images with medical and other scholarly
materials of the day.
An 1882 cartoon in the popular humor magazine Puck is typical.
Titled “The Carrion Crow in the Eagle’s Nest,” the Puck cartoon appeared
the same year Congress enacted its third antipolygamy statute.78

74

WHITE, supra note 52, at 168. While most states’ righters joined the rest of the
nation in condemning polygamy, the close analytical relationship between slavery and
polygamy led the Mormon Church to hire George Washington Biddle, an ardent Democrat,
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The cartoon depicts a fierce eagle, stars and stripes on its wings
representing the United States, protecting its nest, which is labeled “union.”
Inside the nest are eaglets, all White, each labeled for a state. A “carrion
crow” labeled “Utah” rises up in their midst, clutching a bone labeled
“Mormonism.” Three things bear mentioning. First, the cartoon appeared
less than a generation after the end of the Civil War, when most viewers
would situate its imagery within the national catastrophe of Confederate
Secession. Second, it labeled the bird representing Utah as “Carrion Crow.”
This crow gets its name from its habit of eating dead animals, making its
presence in the caption depict Mormonism as a harbinger of death.
Moreover, the birds representing the other states seem to be eaglets, the
same species as the eagle, while the crow represents a new species, black,
holding its own bone and defiantly turning its back on the mother. In
contrast, the eaglets either beg for food or look out as if guarding the nest.
Integrating these elements, we can interpret the single Black crow
among White eaglets as signaling political defiance against the Union,
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racial grounds for denying Utah statehood, and miscegenation. In the
decades after Civil War, intense legal, political, and social battles raged
over the citizenship of African Americans, generally resulting in severely
limited social and political rights for the freed slaves. Consequently, this
cartoon, published in that climate, seems to reference both the Civil War
and the place of Blacks in America in the wake of emancipation. The Black
crow symbolizing Utah, nestled among White eaglets symbolizing the other
states, is akin to the Confederacy seceding to protect its own peculiar
domestic institution. In this view, depicting Utah as a carrion crow would
justify denying “black” Utah membership in the Union just as the Black
Codes and other measures denied African Americans full citizenship.79 The
mix of white and black baby birds in the cartoon also raises the specter of
miscegenation, which animated the Black Codes.80
The nation was struggling over the constitutionality of
miscegenation laws at the very moment that Mormon polygamy attracted
intense debate and regulation. Many southern states repealed their
miscegenation statutes shortly after the Civil War, reasoning that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution allowed
African Americans to contract marriages just like White citizens. 81
However, they reinstated miscegenation laws in the 1880s and 1890s,
claiming that the ban on interracial marriage did not violate principles of
equal protection, since it prevented both Blacks and Whites from marrying
outside their race.82 Indeed, in 1883, a year after “The Carrion Crow,” the
U.S. Supreme Court used this rationale to uphold miscegenation laws in
Pace v. Alabama.83 As the sole Black child among White siblings, the crow
signifies multiracial families produced by race-mixing. By linking Mormon
polygamy with political treason and racialized political and familial
degeneration, the cartoon triggers explosive issues far beyond polygamy as
a marital variation.
Mormon leadership did little to calm these fears. An 1870 sermon
by Brigham Young is typical. He claimed polygamous husbands’ power
extended beyond the family to “my neighbors and the people around me,”

79
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referring to himself as a “king” who controlled his wives and children by
“dictates”:
If I am controlled by the Spirit of the Most High, I am a king, I
am supreme so far as the control of self is concerned; and it also
enables me to control my wives and children . . . They will be
perfectly submissive to my dictates.84

A Mormon bishop’s statement reported in a San Francisco newspaper
similarly confirmed Americans’ worst fears about Mormon political aims:
“Utah will be admitted as a polygamous State, and the other Territories we
have peacefully subjugated will be admitted also. We will then hold the
balance of power, and will dictate to the country.”85 It is hardly surprising
that many Americans heard treason in this kind of talk.
This treason thread running throughout nineteenth century
discussions of Mormon polygamy helps us make sense of the Court’s
assertion in Reynolds that polygamy “fetters its members in stationary
despotism.”86 But the Supreme Court in Reynolds did not stop there, and
also linked polygamy with “Asiatic and African peoples.”87 “The Carrion
Crow” cartoon provides one example of the braided political and racial
elements of Mormon treason. The following Section further elaborates the
racialized arguments regarding Mormon treason made in other cartoons of
the day, medical opinion, melodramatic fiction, as well as the parallel
course of antipolygamy legislation and Chinese Exclusion legislation.
II. MORMON POLYGAMY AS RACE TREASON
The racial aspect of antipolygamy legislation charges White
Mormons with causing the physical and moral degradation of their race by
engaging in a marital practice that was “unnatural” for them, even as it was
“natural” for the purportedly backward, lascivious people of Asia and
Africa. But before reconstructing those arguments and illustrating them
with cartoons of the day, we must address two preliminary objections.
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A. Preliminary Objections

1. Haven’t the Mormons Always Been White?
It may seem odd to depict Mormons as Black or Asian when they
were almost entirely White. Indeed, while Mormon settlers married Native
American women on occasion, 88 Mormons excluded African-Americans
from full church participation until 1978.89 This Whiteness, according to
many antipolygamists, was precisely the problem.
Antipolygamists did not see Blacks “acting Black” as a problem,
since that supposedly reflected natural differences between races. But
Whites following practices attributed to Asians or Blacks undermined the
premises justifying white supremacy. The links between race and Mormon
polygamy in many nineteenth century Americans’ minds were both tight
and complex. The closeness of the link is apparent in the common
discussion of slavery and polygamy as the “twin relics of barbarism.” 90
This phrase, and the linkage of the two “peculiar institutions,” was so
widespread that the Republican Party’s 1856 Presidential Platform pledged
to eradicate the “twin relics of barbarism” in the territories.91 Scholars have
noted the link between the “twin relics,” 92 but have not mapped the
complexity of racial motivations for antipolygamy law. Here, I argue that
the racialized strand of antipolygamist discourse demonstrates that abolition
and antipolygamy rhetoric assumed diametrically opposed postures in
relation to white supremacy. Abolitionists sought to decrease racial
hierarchy through emancipation. Antipolygamists, in contrast, sought either
to maintain or reinstate white supremacy, perhaps hoping to limit the scope
of slaves’ emancipation by equating racial mixing with disorder, and,
conversely, associating racial hierarchy with domestic political order. In
88
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other words, many nineteenth century Americans condemned slavery for
harming Blacks, and polygamy for harming Whites.

2. But They’re Just Cartoons
One might argue that they are just cartoons and were never meant
or interpreted as seriously as this Article suggests. True. But humor tells us
a lot about social conventions, and it helps us read cases and statutes in light
of the culture of the time. Nineteenth century Americans read political
magazines—Harpers, The Judge, and Puck, for example—in general stores,
blacksmith shops, taverns, or wherever they gathered. Literate people read
to others, and everyone understood the cartoons. The cartoons analyzed
here, therefore, likely reflected and helped shape political opinions, and
ultimately, policy. Moreover, readers’ humor tells us what they found
incongruous, like a dog commanding its master to “sit.” If nineteenth
century viewers laughed at the stock features of antipolygamy cartoons—
multi-racial families, powerful women, and effeminate men—that laughter
was like our chuckle at the headline “Man Bites Dog.” Looking at these
cartoons together with other primary sources reveals an encrypted caption
below most of the cartoons that reads, “Too much choice leads to chaos;
let’s return to the certainties of status.”
B. Mormons as Racial Others
Again and again, commentators from high culture (media and legal
experts mainly) and popular culture (cartoonists and authors of magazine
articles) portray Mormons as barbaric, lascivious, despotic, disorderly,
foreign, Black, Asian, and/or childish. Perhaps the best example “Uncle
Sam’s Troublesome Bedfellows,” published in the Wasp just a month after
the Court announced its decision in Reynolds.93

93
Uncle Sam’s Troublesome Bedfellows, THE WASP, Feb. 8, 1879, reprinted in
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Uncle Sam, representing the country, shares a big bed with three
“troublesome bedfellows,” and is in the process of kicking out two others.
Lumping Mormon, Chinese, Native American, Black, and Irish figures as
“troublesome bedfellows” served two purposes. First, it suggested a
common debasement of all five groups. Second, it distinguished all of them
from Uncle Sam. Edward Said explains, in the colonial context, how
designating people or groups as “problems” rather than human beings
determined their defeat from the outset:
Along with all other peoples variously designated as backward,
degenerate, uncivilized, and retarded, the Orientals were viewed
in a framework constructed out of biological determinism and
moral-political admonishment . . . Orientals were rarely seen or
looked at; they were seen through, analyzed, not as citizens, or
even people, but as problems, to be solved or confined or . . .
taken over. The point is that the very designation of something as
Oriental involved an already pronounced evaluative judgment,
and . . . an implicit program of action. Since the Oriental was a
member of a subject race, he had to be subjected.94

Indeed, the cartoon depicts subjugation of both Mormon and Chinese
figures through Uncle Sam kicking both out of bed. The Mormon
polygamist’s bottom is about to hit the floor. The paper he clutches, labeled
“polygamy,” may simply announce the reason for his ejection, or perhaps
94
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also refers the government’s formal declaration of that policy through the
Reynolds opinion weeks earlier. The Chinese figure’s ponytail labels him,
and his placement mid-air may reflect Uncle Sam’s not-yet-completed
exclusion of Chinese immigrants. As of February 1879, the date of the
cartoon, Congress was in the midst of its multi-stage exclusion of Chinese
immigrants.
That very same month, Congress was debating the Fifteen
Passenger Bill, which prohibited more than fifteen Chinese passengers from
being brought on any steamship to the United States. 95 Maine Senator
James Blaine’s arguments supporting the Bill framed the issue as a racial
contest for dominance of the American West: “either the Anglo-Saxon race
will possess the Pacific slope or the Mongolians will possess it.”96 Blaine
escalated the “us/them” rhetoric in a widely reprinted letter to the New York
Tribune a week later, condemning Chinese immigration as “‘vicious,’
‘odious,’ ‘abominable,’ ‘dangerous,’ and ‘revolting,’” and comparing the
Chinese to an infection that would bring “‘moral and physical disease,
destitution, and death.’”97 Blaine’s view prevailed. On February 22, 1879, a
month after Reynolds was announced and two weeks after the publication of
“Uncle Sam’s Troublesome Bedfellows,” Congress passed the Fifteen
Passenger Bill.98
Returning to the cartoon, Uncle Sam’s other “troublesome
bedfellows” remained, at least for the moment: a Native American sticking
a long finger in Uncle Sam’s ear; a Black figure grinning foolishly; and a
simian Irishman clutching a bottle. The simian Irishman deserves brief note,
since nineteenth century understandings of Irish people as Black show how
95
8 CONG. REC. 1748, 1796–97 (1879) (debating H.R. 2423 on Feb. 22, 1879). On
March 1, 1879, President Hayes vetoed the Bill, explaining that it violated the Burlingame
Treaty that allowed free Chinese immigration. ANDREW GYORY, CLOSING THE GATE: RACE,
POLITICS, AND THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT 218 (1998). Congress accordingly amended the
Burlingame Treaty in November of 1880 to allow the United States to limit or suspend, but
not prohibit, Chinese immigration if the United States decided that doing so was in the
country’s best interest. Id. The following year the Senate ratified the Angell Treaty, solely
“to give the United States the right to restrict Chinese immigration.” Id. For further
discussion of barriers to Asian American citizenship, see Leti Volpp, “Obnoxious to Their
Very Nature:” Asian Americans and Constitutional Citizenship, 8 ASIAN L. J. 71 (2001)
96
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Whiteness was a culturally constructed insider status designating civic
membership that could be denied to unpopular Whites.99 An 1876 cover of
Harper’s Magazine featured a Thomas Nast cartoon titled “The Ignorant
Vote: Honors are Easy,” showing an emancipated slave and an Irishman,
equating the two by placing them on a scale facing one another:100

Similarly, Puck magazine ran a James A. Wales cartoon in
November 1880 titled “An Irish Jig.”101 It portrayed a wild Irishman with
simian features, dancing and brandishing a dagger toward a concerned
Uncle Sam and John Bull (who personified England):
99
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Taken together, these cartoons shed light on Irish as Black, in the
nineteenth century popular imagination. Moreover, highlighting the
denigration—which literally means “blackening” 102 —of both White
Mormons and Irish people in the late nineteenth century demonstrates how
many Americans then linked race and nationality. “We,” meaning Whites
descended from Northern Europe (but not Ireland), determined the terms of
“their” (Chinese, Native American, African American, Irish, and Mormon)
participation in American democracy. Given this power disparity, “we”
should prevail in any contest with “them.” But lumping marginalized
groups as “them” tells only part of the story. Deeper analysis reveals more
sophisticated machinations.
C. Polygamy Causing Racial Degeneration
Political, medical, and popular sources repeat the theme that
Mormon polygamy created a new race of effete men, ungovernable hordes
of women and children, and primitive characteristics like licentiousness,
laziness, childishness, and submissiveness to despotism. In this teleological
102

MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 333 (11th ed. 2007).
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perspective, civilization rose “like the sun in the farthest reaches of the East
and advanced progressively westward,” leaving behind China, India, and
the Arab world as cultures “past their glory.”103 The metaphor, grounded in
a natural phenomenon, created a framework for the West’s inevitable and
innate superiority. Within this intellectual rubric, parity between Eastern
and Western cultures was as unlikely as the sun changing its course.
The materials examined below link Mormon polygamy with fears
of White racial degeneration that produced a naturalized discourse linking a
person’s condition of birth to a “natural” form of marriage: polygamous if
“Asiatic or African,” and monogamous if White. Purported experts
reporting on the exotic practice of Mormon plural marriage often spoke of
polygamy’s degenerative effect on children born into plural marriages.104
Focusing on children complemented the implicit temporality of civilization
marching from East to West (from Asia to Whiteness) as inevitably as
afternoon follows morning, because a person’s life followed a similarly
predictable course. Children, in this view, personify the future, so that their
actions in the cartoons seem to predict polygamy’s effect on coming
generations, and indeed the nation’s future.
One territorial official, Benjamin Ferris, voiced those concerns in
an 1854 Report to Congress, declaring that polygamy “belongs now to the
indolent and opium-eating Turks and Asiatic, the miserable Africans, the
North American savages, and the latter-day saints.”105 As a consequence,
Farris contended, the results of polygamy would shortly “manifest in the
rapid degeneracy of races.” 106 Samuel Bowles, an abolitionist journalist,
also linked polygamy with degeneration in his 1865 travelogue Across the
Continent: “It is safe to predict that a few generations of such social
practices will breed a physical, moral, and mental debasement of the people
most frightful to contemplate.”107 An 1857 article entitled “Scenes in an
American Harem” echoed this view by diagnosing both racial and gender
103
JOHN KUO WEI TCHEN, NEW YORK BEFORE CHINATOWN: ORIENTALISM AND THE
SHAPING OF AMERICAN CULTURE 1776–1882, at xvi (1999).
104

Talbot, supra note 4, at 334.
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BENJAMIN G. FERRIS, UTAH AND THE MORMONS: THE HISTORY, GOVERNMENT,
DOCTRINES, CUSTOMS, AND PROSPECTS OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS, FROM PERSONAL
OBSERVATION DURING A SIX-MONTHS’ RESIDENCE AT GREAT SALT LAKE CITY 247 (1854).
106

Id. at 247; Talbot, supra note 4, at 334.

107
Talbot, supra note 4, at 334–45 (quoting SAMUEL BOWLES, ACROSS
CONTINENT: A SUMMER’S JOURNEY TO THE ROCKY MOUNTAINS, THE MORMONS, AND
PACIFIC STATES, WITH SPEAKER COLFAX 124 (1865)).
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deterioration of Whites through “very weak-minded” Mormon women and
linking the fate of the (White) nation to Mormonism by asserting “Salt Lake
polygamy must rob the Anglo-Saxon females of their boast of intellect, and
the age of its vaunt of progress.”108
Hugely popular antipolygamy novels echoed these themes of
racialized and gendered degeneration. Maria Ward’s novel The Mormon
Wife, reissued repeatedly after its 1855 publication, typified the genre.109 It
cast White Mormon wives as slaves, luridly detailing their capture,
punishment, and submission. 110 Mary Hudson’s 1880 novel Esther the
Gentile dramatically asserted that “Mormon women are slaves to their
husbands, concubines to their religion, and martyrs to despotism as immoral
as the cursed Sodom of old.”111 Analyzing this genre, literary critic Nancy
Bentley asserts that “monogamy for white wives . . . approach[ed]
something of a racial birthright and a fact of natural history.” 112 These
fictional accounts typically demonstrated the impact of polygamy on White
female bodies through their immediate collapse after entering a plural
marriage. Bentley explains, “Though they formally assent, in the
conventional resolution to the wedding scene first wives regularly faint after
speaking their consent, the first sign of an illness that usually kills or drives
them mad after this injury to their womanhood.”113
These fictional accounts of polygamy’s dramatic impact on White
women’s bodies exemplify the larger focus on the bodies of Mormon
polygamists. Medical research purported to identify physical peculiarities of
children born of polygamous unions. The racial focus of these “scientific”
108
Id. at 334 (quoting, Scenes in an American Harem, HARPERS WEEKLY, Oct. 10,
1857, at 649).
109

GORDON, supra note 16, at 29.
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Bentley, supra note 92, at 346.
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Id. at 347.

112

Id. at 357–58.

113
Id. at 349. Barthelow’s “scientific” report on Mormon polygamy similarly
described the bodily devastation that polygamy caused in White women: “In Eastern life,
where it has been a recognized domestic institution for ages, women are prepared for its
continuance, and do not feel degraded by their association with it. The women of this
Territory, how fanatical and ignorant soever, recognize their wide departure from the normal
standard in all Christian countries; and from the degradation of the mother follows that of the
child, and physical degeneracy is not a remote consequence of moral depravity.” Roberts
Barthelow, Hereditary Descent; or Depravity of the Offspring of Polygamy Among the
Mormons, 30 DEBOW’S REV. 206, 210 (1861).
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findings, understood as a parallel cultural discourse to antipolygamy
statutes and case law, shows how often nineteenth century Americans
bundled polygamy with both race and gender-based degeneracy.
Medical opinion, boasting unique expertise in bodies, may have
proved especially influential in shaping the national view of polygamous
Mormons as physically deficient. This discourse was deeply steeped in the
scientific racism of the day that served larger social agendas. Alabama
gynecologist Dr. J. Marion Sims, for example, sometimes dubbed a
founding father of gynecology, developed his expertise in the 1840s by
performing experimental surgeries on unanesthetized slaves, contending
that Blacks did not feel pain.114
Dr. Roberts Barthelow applied this brand of scientific rigor to
studying the Mormons. Barthelow developed his skills at so-called
scientific classification early in his career while attending the U.S. Troops
in Utah during the Mormon War in 1857 and 1858. 115 He reported his
findings to the U.S. Surgeon General, presented them to the Senate, and
published them in 1860.116 Beginning by noting the “tendency of peculiar
institutions . . . [to] produce permanent varieties of the peculiar race,”
Barthelow proceeded to identify what he termed the new Mormon “racial
type” in gendered terms of physical and moral weakness:
This condition is shown by the preponderance of female births;
by the mortality in infantine life; by the large proportion of the
aluminous and gelatinous types of constitution; and by the
striking uniformity of the facial expression . . . . One of the most

114

HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT
65 (2007) (“He claimed that his procedures were ‘not painful enough to justify the trouble
and risk attending the administration [of anesthesia]’ . . . . Sims always cited the popular
belief that blacks did not feel pain in the same way as whites.”) (footnote omitted).
115

B. Cameron Hardy & Dan Erickson, “Regeneration—Now and Evermore!”:
Mormon Polygamy and the Physical Rehabilitation of Humankind, 10 J. HIST. SEX. 40, 48
(2001).
116

Talbot, supra note 4, at 335. Barthelow’s report was reprinted under the title
Hereditary Descent, note 113 supra. This publication, reporting an 1860 meeting of the New
Orleans Academy of Science, also included commentary criticizing Barthelow’s findings as
failing to comply with the scientific method. Id. at 207–08. See also CHARLES A. CANNON,
THE AWESOME POWER OF SEX (1974); Terryl L. Givens, New Religious Movements and
Orthodoxy: The Challenge to the Religious Mainstream, 19 FARMS REV. 203 (2007).
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deplorable effects . . . is shown in the genital weakness of the
boys and young men, the progeny of the peculiar institution.”117

Barthelow further explicated his findings in quasi-racial terms, describing
the “genital weakness” as evidenced by:
An expression compounded of sensuality, cunning, suspicion,
and a smirking self-conceit. The yellow, sunken, cadaverous
visage; the greenish-colored eye; the thick, protuberant lips; the
low forehead; the light, yellowish hair; and the lank, angular
person, constitute an appearance so characteristic of the new race,
the production of polygamy, as to distinguish them at a glance.118

According to Barthelow, polygamy monkeyed with Whites’ natural
tendency toward monogamy. 119 Departing from that norm, in this view,
caused the White children of polygamy to evidence characteristics of
purportedly backward groups for whom polygamy was “natural.”120
Barthelow was hardly alone in these views. Professor C.G. Forshey
teamed up with Dr. Samuel Cartwright to publish Barthelow’s 1861 Report
as part of the proceedings of the New Orleans Academy of Science. 121
Forshey provided commentary to the Report:
For the female of those oriental and tropical races, practicing
polygamy, there is no high intellectual destiny—no aspiration
after the pure and beautiful; but a pre-ordained servitude,
compatible with their nature, and adapted to the semi-civilization
which is the acme of development in the races to which they
belong. Extinction, then, is not a tendency of Eastern polygamy,
as in the European race of men. It is not a violation of natural
law, where the natural instincts in the normal condition of the
race do not forbid it.122
117

Talbot, supra note 4, at 335.

118

Id. at 335–36 (quoting SURGEON GENERAL’S OFFICE, STATISTICAL REPORT

119

Id.

120

Id.
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Hereditary Descent, supra note 113.

302).

122

Id. at 211. Significantly, the publication includes objections from several
members of the New Orleans Academy of Science on the ground that Barthelow’s research
did not follow scientific method. Id. at 210.

2010]

Race Treason

317

Dr. Cartwright, famous for his works in scientific racism such as
Diseases and Peculiarities of the Negro Race,123 echoed these concepts of
natural mandates, explicitly contrasting the marital (and consequent social,
political, and economic) practices of “the inferior colored races” with “the
European (or white race of men)”:
The fact that the inferior colored races, among whom polygamy
is universal, are self-sustaining, proves that is has not the same
pernicious influences upon them as on the white race.”124

Forshey added divine mandate into the mix, asserting that:
the European (or white race of men) has never been a polygamist
before. It is contrary to his nature and instincts. Created,
manifestly, for a higher destiny—an instinctive abhorrence of the
brutality of a promiscuous intercourse is impressed upon the
males and especially the females of the race.125

While these views seem cartoonish a century and a half later, we need only
look to actual cartoons of the day to see how common they were.
Over and over, antipolygamy cartoons deride plural marriage as a
disorderly or backward domestic arrangement, implicitly analogizing
household disorder to government disorder. Chaotic domestic scenes depict
brawling wives and screaming children while a sidelined husband fails to
exercise proper authority over his wives and children by virtue of being
outnumbered. 126 Racial disorderliness frequently makes an appearance in
these scenes through one Black child among many White ones, like “The
Carrion Crow” already described. Another popular image is one White
Mormon man accompanied by many wives of different races and
nationalities, making the numerosity and miscegenation jokes in the same
123

WASHINGTON, supra note 114, at 36. Cartwright “discovered” slave diseases
such as “drapetomania” (the pathological desire to flee slavery) and “dysaethesia aethiopica”
(“called by overseers ‘rascality,’” and “so great a hebetude of intellectual faculties, as to be
like a person half asleep” which, according to Cartwright, afflicted “nearly all” free Blacks
“that have not got some white person to direct and to take care of them.”). Id.
124

Talbot, supra note 4, at 336 (quoting Samuel A. Cartwright, in Hereditary
Descent, supra note 116, at 214).
125

Id. (quoting Forshey, in Hereditary Descent, supra note 113, at 211).

126
See, e.g., The Elder’s Happy Home, CHIC, Apr. 19, 1881, reprinted in BUNKER
& BITTON, supra note 78, at 89.
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breath. 127 Implicitly, these scenes assert that if Mormons cannot govern
their households, they cannot properly govern their territory. Some cartoons
feature Uncle Sam as a father figure, either disciplining the unruly children
(who might signify territories or unpopular groups), or lounging in an
armchair when he should be disciplining “problems” like Mormons and
Indians for defying federal authority.128
Effeminacy, frightening numerous women and children, and racial
and national diversity of those wives and children seem like code for the
danger of racial degeneration and collective disorder through polygamy. For
example, an 1870 cartoon titled “A Mormon Family out for a Walk”
features one wizened, weak man leading four or five wives of various races
and nationalities.129

Here, one Black wife (portrayed as a mammy) is trailed by an ugly one, the
latter figure perhaps joking that in polygamy even a plain Jane can get
married. A Japanese figure could be wife or child. Scores of children follow
behind. Thirty years later, as Congress held hearings to determine whether
127

See, e.g., A Mormon Family Out for a Walk, in THE COMIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1870), reprinted in BUNKER & BITTON, supra note 78, at 130.
128
See, e.g., The Three Troublesome Children, THE WASP, Dec. 16, 1881,
reprinted in BUNKER & BITTON, supra note 78, at 79; GORDON, supra note 16, at 205.
129

A Mormon Family Out for a Walk, supra note 127.
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Mormons still practiced polygamy, the joke still had traction. A 1904
cartoon titled “Mormon Elder-berry—Out with His Six Year-Olds, Who
Take after Their Mothers,” published in Life Magazine, ridicules Mormon
fecundity as well as racial and national diversity.130

In this image the polygamist father’s name, “Elder-berry” may be a
play on Mormons’ habit of calling even young men “Elder,” and perhaps
also a racial joke for those who knew the scientific name of elderberry, or
Black Elder, was “Sambucus Nigra.”131 The main joke seems to stem from
what Barthelow called the “preponderance of female births” (all but one or
two of the children appear to be female) and ethnic diversity as reflected by
the Scottish, Native American, Japanese, Dutch, and African American
children of this White man.
Back in the 1880s, Mormons determinedly continued to practice
polygamy, despite multiple federal statutes and a line of cases upholding the
federal government’s efforts to force them to stop.132 Two cartoons feature
130

Mormon Elder-berry—Out with His Six Year-Olds, Who Take after Their
Mothers, LIFE, Apr. 28, 1904, reprinted in BUNKER & BITTON, supra note 78, at 81.
131
Few readers might have known of elderberry’s medicinal and ornamental uses,
as well as the fact that it is poisonous to mammals and is often classified as a weed. See
U.S.D.A. NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, COMMON ELDERBERRY PLANT
GUIDE (2006), available at http://plants.usda.gov/plantguide/pdf/cs_sanic4.pdf.
132

GORDON, supra note 16, at 87.
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domestic scenes decrying polygamy’s political and domestic disorder, as
well as the federal government’s inability to end the practice. “The Elder’s
Happy Home,” published in April of 1881, presents the familiar scene of a
sidelined patriarch overwhelmed by his many wives and children:133

Unlike Mormon Elder-berry, this Mormon elder cannot govern his
huge family, and lies prone on the armoire to the right. While Elder-berry’s
six-year-olds obediently hold hands, these numerous wives and children
scream and fight. Note the one Black child in the cradle. Like “The Carrion
Crow” in the cartoon discussed above, 134 this lone Black child could
reference miscegenation (though none of the wives appear Black), the
“Blackness” of the entire scene, or a future in which purportedly White
domestic ordering gets displaced by chaotic scenes like this one.
Another 1881 cartoon, titled “The Three Troublesome Children,”
similarly associates political and domestic disorder with Mormon
polygamy, adding an explicitly political dimension by referencing federal
treatment of Chinese and Native Americans.135

133

The Elder’s Happy Home, supra note 126.

134

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.

135

The Three Troublesome Children, supra note 128.
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Like Uncle Sam’s “troublesome bedfellows,” discussed earlier,136
this cartoon deploys a domestic scene to argue for limiting pluralism in the
growing nation. But where Uncle Sam was booting Mormon and Chinese
“problems” out of bed in “Uncle Sam’s Troublesome Bedfellows,”137 here
he is inactive. He languidly reads a newspaper labeled “Politics,” dollar
signs in the place of headlines suggesting concern with commerce rather
than the more immediate matters demanding attention in the cartoon’s
foreground. There, three “troublesome children” harass a beleaguered
Columbia. On one knee a Chinese child pulls Columbia’s hair like the
Native American poking a finger in Uncle Sam’s ear in the “Troublesome
Bedfellows” cartoon.138 On the other knee a simian polygamist batters her
with a pipe, and at her feet a Native American child sits, clubbing lead U.S.
soldiers with a tomahawk. The blanket draped across Uncle Sam’s wicker
chair, labeled “Law,” suggests the (unused) remedy for this abuse: more
statutes and more prosecutions.
136

See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, Congress passed the third antipolygamy statute, the
Edmunds Act, on March 22, 1882, 139 just three months after the Wasp
published “The Three Troublesome Children.” that Congress also passed
the anti-Chinese Fifteen Passenger Act in 1882. Reading the two statutes in
light of cartoons like “The Three Troublesome Children” situates the
antipolygamy statute squarely within a larger press to define citizenship in
racial terms.140
Another cartoon, published in between the third and fourth
antipolygamy statutes, enthusiastically supported the use of federal force to
move Mormons back toward Whiteness. In 1885, the Judge published a
cartoon captioned “Hit ‘em Again.”141 It features a Crusader whose tunic
seems labeled “Edmunds,” seemingly representing the Vermont Senator
George Edmunds for whom the 1882 Edmunds Bill is named. The cartoon
emphasizes the knight as personification of the Federal Government with
his armored forearms, resembling columns on an American government
building, in sharp contrast to the feudal towers of the “Mormon Castle” in
the background. Edmunds wields a sword labeled “Edmunds Bill” over a
cowering Turk, who clasps a primitive club labeled “polygamy.” The
contest’s outcome is made clear by the Turk’s cowering posture, coupled
with the viewer’s knowledge that the polygamist’s blunt, if menacing, club
is no match for Edmund’s sharp sword (just as his flimsy headscarf is no
match for Edmunds’ armor helmet).

139

Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30 (1882) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1461)
(repealed 1983).
140

While post-Civil War legislation granted citizenship to “aliens of African
nativity and persons of African descent,” it continued to bar even native-born Asian
Americans from citizenship until 1898. ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS AND THE ASIANAMERICAN EXPERIENCE 23–24 (2d ed. 2006). Not until the 1940s did Asian immigrants
obtain citizenship rights. Id. The Supreme Court upheld race-based exclusions, asserting that
if “the government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to
be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed.” Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1881). For a brief description of various aspects of
citizenship, see Volpp, supra note 95, at 71-72.
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Hit ‘em Again, THE JUDGE, 1885, reprinted in BUNKER & BITTON, supra note
78, at 118; GORDON, supra note 16, at 184.
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Nineteenth century viewers could hardly be surprised to see the Mormon
Question played out as a battle, given the Mormon War. The battle lasted a
full fifty years in large part because, unlike the cringing Turk, the Mormons
fought back, often using the very same tools aimed against them.
D. Mormon Response: Polygamy Improves the Race
Consistent with Mormons’ millennial beliefs, they contended plural
marriage would elevate Mormons to something like divine status by
producing a “special race, possessing the complexions of angels,”142 and
ushering in the Millennium. While they rejected the theory of biological
evolution, they appropriated Darwinian imagery to argue what Territorial
Representative in Congress, George Q. Cannon, called “the physiological
side” of polygamy.143 Just as Cartwright and Forshey marshaled “scientific”
142
Hardy & Erickson, supra note 115, at 58 (citing Territorial Representative
George Q. Cannon).
143

Id. at 56, 57.
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arguments attesting to Mormon physiological weakness, 144 a Mormon
named George A. Smith lauded academic research predicting that the
Mormon practices would “in about seventy years . . . produce a race of men
who would be able to walk the rest of the human race under foot.” 145
Consistent with this aggressive claim, Mormon leader Joseph F. Smith
declared “Our business is to reclaim this earth. We have set out to
regenerate the human family.”146 In some respects, they were more open
than other White Americans to embracing whole human family. Rather than
invariably distancing themselves from the Orientalist imagery described
above, Mormons sometimes embraced the association with foreignness,
Catholicism, and non-democratic governments. One article in the Mormon
newspaper Millennial Star predicted that before the turn of the twentieth
century, Mormon polygamists would be sent overseas as “rulers and
ambassadors” and “receive as much adulation, world-wide applause, and
national respect . . . as the Grandest Sultan, the Holiest Pope, or the most
powerful Emperor could desire.” 147 Indeed, rather than concede the
barbarity of polygamy, Mormons contended that plural marriage was more
civilized than monogamy. Mormon physician Romania Pratt echoed these
claims, deployed rhetoric associating monogamy with darkness and
barbarism:
With this principle universal, but limited and governed by laws of
marriage inhibiting sensuality and selfishness . . . the solution to
the growing social evil would be found. . . . Were this the order
of the world, abortions, feticides, infanticides, seductions, rapes
and divorces would be relics of the barbarous age, while
intelligence, light, peace and good will and love would be the
motor forces of the world—in short the Millennium would have
come.148

These political and theological assertions reveal both why so many
Americans feared and despised the Mormons, and also the ideological
144

See supra Part III.C.
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Hardy & Erickson, supra note 115, at 57.
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Id. at 58.
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Id. at 59 (quoting Charles W. Penrose, Polygamy and the Visit of the Sultan,
MILLENNIAL STAR, Aug. 3, 1867, at 492–93).
148
Hardy & Erickson, supra note 115, at 61 (quoting Romania Bunnell Pratt,
Extract from Dr. R.B. Pratt’s Lecture, WOMAN’S EXPONENT, June 15, 1881, at 16).
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structures that enabled Mormons to withstand intense Federal pressure for
nearly half a century. But Americans who bristled at the very idea of
Mormon polygamy did so for different reasons.
E. Plurality of Opinion about Mormon Polygamy
The discourse examined thus far shows how many White and
mostly male Americans used polygamy to shore up white supremacy. While
many African American and feminist commentators shared the mainstream
views of polygamy as barbaric and dangerous,149 they focused on different
aspects of similar arguments. Most notably, African Americans did not
voice concerns about race degeneration, instead using antipolygamy
arguments before the war to buttress anti-slavery arguments, and overall to
enhance African American’s citizenship claims by associating polygamy
with foreign-ness. Feminists, in contrast, disagreed over whether to support
Utah granting women the vote in 1870, and also whether monogamy,
championed by antipolygamists, was itself harmful to women.
African Americans used antipolygamy sentiment to bolster antislavery arguments by pointing out that defenders of both “peculiar
institutions” justified them as biblically authorized or protected under
principles of local control. An 1854 article, for example, ridiculed biblical
defenses of slavery by pointing out that “polygamy can in the same manner,
be justified by ‘biblical texts and passages.’”150 Another piece published a
few weeks later derided local control arguments as “squatter sovereignty”:
“Squatter Sovereignty,” the nest in which Slavery was to be
warmed into life, is the nest in which this vile system of
149
An 1899 column in the Afro-American warned of the harms that polygamy
posed for the nation itself:

Polygamy in Utah, though outlawed, is still practiced in secret. It has
warred against the marriage relation throughout the land. It is impossible
to have such an awful sewer of inequity sending up its miasma, which is
wafted by the winds north, south, east and west, without the whole land
being affected by it.
AFRO-AM., Sept. 23, 1899, at 4. Like mainstream periodicals, African Americans found
humor in polygamy, as shown by a quip printed in 1912 in The Chicago Defender,
“Teacher—‘The right to have more than one wife is called polygamy. What is it when only
one wife is allowed a man?’ Willie—‘Monotony, ma’am.’” As It seems to Willy, THE
CHICAGO DEFENDER, June 1, 1912, at 5 (copy on file with author).
150
A Reverend Defender of Slavery, in FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS (1854)
(copy on file with author).
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Polygamy has been hatched . . . In virtue of it, infanticide and
sutteeism may spring up and flourish in our Western Territories,
whenever there shall be enough immigrants from Asia to
constitute Territorial Governments – and this Federal
Government must look on in silence, its wings outspread over all
things hateful and devilish.151

The danger of powerful individual states emerges again in an 1854
article describing Brigham Young as “a law unto himself,” who “has
squatted upon the territory of the United States,” and linking Young’s
“peculiar institution of polygamy” with the Mormons’ separatist theocracy:
Another peculiar institution of Utah is the amalgamation of
Church and State, both of which Brigham Young is supreme
head. In short, the power and influence of Young is as unlimited
as the number of his wives or of his progeny.152

Some African American commentators, like the mainstream, associated
polygamy with Asia and Africa. In 1898, for example, the Rev. Dr.
Talmage exhorted readers of the Afro-American to cultivate loving and
orderly families, warning that “[s]ocialism and polygamy, and the most
damnable of all things, free-lovism, have been trying to turn this earth into a
Turkish harem.” 153 Similarly, the Christian Recorder, newspaper of the
African Methodist Episcopal Church, published pieces associating
polygamy with Islam and decrying African polygamy as “the chief obstacle
to the spread of Christianity.”154
Other African American commentators used polygamy to argue for
federal intervention in other, more pressing problems, like lynching. An
1899 editorial in the African American newspaper Cleveland Gazette
exemplifies this view. An “eminent and race-loving Afro-American
151

Squatter Sovereignty and Polygamy, NATIONAL ERA, Mar. 24, 1854, reprinted
in FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS, supra note 150.
152
Let the People Rule, THE NORTH STAR, Dec. 22, 1854, reprinted in FREDERICK
DOUGLASS PAPERS supra note 150. Douglass published the North Star beginning in 1841.
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Congress,
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trr085.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
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Rev. Dr. Talmage, The Eminent Divine’s Sunday Discourse, AFRO-AM., Nov.

5, 1898, at 4.
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CHRISTIAN RECORDER, July 23, 1874. See also Rev. A.M. Stewart, Letters
XXXII, Mormons, CHRISTIAN RECORDER, March 20, 1869 (copy on file with author).
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gentleman” roundly condemned Mormon polygamy, then urged the
government remedy the injustices of lynching:
As bad as is the sin of polygamy, it does not seek the lives of
human beings. It indulges in no vengeful feeling of resentment,
mutilating, butchering, torturing and burning living mortals only
to appease a brutal nature. But lynch law does all this and more. .
. . The government dares to challenge the right of polygamy, but
tremblingly and pitifully it quails in the presence of a gigantic
crime which every day gathers strength and flaunts its murderous
blood-stained hands in the face of Christendom.155

Along the same lines, African American activist and novelist Frances
Harper had a character in her 1892 novel Iola Leroy sharply observe that
post-Civil War federalism created an “aristocracy of race wide enough to
include the South with its treason and Utah with its abominations, but too
narrow to include the bravest colored man” who fought for the Union
Army.156 In short, African Americans seem to have responded strategically
to the antipolygamy campaign. They marshaled popular antipolygamy
arguments toward their own ends of abolishing slavery and, later, defending
Black citizenship claims. While some African Americans shared the
common association of polygamy with Asia and Africa, the few materials
available appear aimed at strengthening African American citizenship
claims, perhaps by dissociating from other unpopular groups like Asians.
Nineteenth century feminists also engaged in polygamy debates to
serve their own ends. However, while African American commentators
uniformly condemned polygamy, feminist responses were slightly more
mixed. Female suffrage and changing regulation of marriage were central to
feminist attitudes toward polygamy.
A good number of feminists initially praised Utah for granting
women the vote in 1870, and argued that enfranchising Utah women would
eliminate Mormon polygamy, predicting that Utah women would vote it out
of existence. 157 One major group, the National Women’s Suffrage
Association (“NWSA”), went further, departing sharply from mainstream
155
Polygamy or Lynching?, CLEVELAND GAZETTE, Nov. 18, 1899, at 2, available
at http://dbs.ohiohistory.org/africanam/det.cfm?ID=19214.
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condemnation of polygamy by making common cause with polygamist
wives. 158 The American Women’s Suffrage Association (“AWSA”), in
contrast, refused to work with polygamous wives.159
The NWSA’s embrace of polygamous wives allowed those
feminists to use the defects of polygamy to point out similar defects in
monogamy, akin to the way some African Americans used polygamy as a
club to combat slavery. Matilda Jocelyn Gage, abolitionist and NWSA
leader, argued that both Mormon polygamy and Christian monogamy
reduced women to slaves, as did every religion:
Polygamy is but one development of the doctrine of woman’s
created inferiority, the constant tendency of which is to make her
a mere slave under every form of religion extant.160

In 1871, shortly after Utah enfranchised women, Susan B. Anthony and
Elizabeth Cady Stanton visited Utah and spoke to Mormon women at the
Tabernacle.161 Stanton’s description of this discussion reveals her view that
Mormon women shared common burdens with other women:
I gave a brief history of the marriage institution in all times and
countries, of the matriarchate, when the mother was the head of
the family and owned the property and children; of the
patriarchate, when man reigned supreme and women were
enslaved; of polyandry, polygamy, monogamy, and prostitution.
We had a full and free discussion of every phase of the question,
and we all agreed that we were still far from having reached the
ideal position for women in marriage however satisfied man
might be with his various experiments. Though the Mormon
women, like all others, stoutly defend their own religion, yet they
[are] no more satisfied than any other sect.162
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She went still further afield of mainstream ridicule of Mormonism by
acknowledging their good will and Biblical authority for polygamy, though
ultimately asserting that “religions are human inventions”:
I stood among these simple people, so earnest in making their
experiment in religion and social life, and remembered all the
persecutions they had suffered . . . . Their faith finds abundant
authority in the Bible, in the examples of God’s chosen people. . .
. When women understand that governments and religions are
human inventions . . . they will no longer be oppressed by the
injunctions that come to them with the divine authority of “Thus
saith the Lord.”163

This posture of solidarity with women qua women, and skeptical posture
toward all religions, led the NWSA, unlike the AWSA, to work alongside
Mormon women. In 1879, the NWSA invited two Mormon women,
Emmeline B. Wells and Zina Young Williams, to the National Women’s
Suffrage Convention in Washington, DC. 164 Wells was currently in a
polygamous marriage. Young was Brigham Young’s daughter and a
widowed plural wife.165
The AWSA, in contrast, refused to associate with Mormon women.
This allegiance to convention also found expression in the AWSA’s view of
polygamy as both different from and inferior to Christian monogamy. An
article in the AWSA magazine the Women’s Journal melded monogamy
and Christianity by analogizing Christ appointing Peter as the rock which
he based his church to monogamy’s role for women’s equality,166 asserting
that “[m]onogamy is the rock upon which the church of Woman’s Equality
is founded.”167 But although AWSA leaders like the married couple Lucy
Stone and Henry Blackwell condemned Mormon polygamy, they sharply
criticized marital conventions themselves. When they married in 1855,
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Stone retained her maiden name,168 and they altered their wedding vows to
defy legal rules that subordinated wives:
While acknowledging our mutual affection by publicity assuming
the relationship of husband and wife . . . we deem it a duty to
declare that this act on our part implies no sanction of, nor
promise of voluntary obedience to such of the present laws of
marriage as refuse to recognize the wife as an independent,
rational being, while they confer upon the husband an injurious
and unnatural superiority.169

The NWSA used this resistance to off-the-rack monogamy to fight back
when the AWSA publicly condemned the NWSA for associating with
Mormon women. 170 The NWSA’s Gage chided Stone and Blackwell for
criticizing polygamy when they themselves tried to alter the terms of
conventional marriage, observing that “[i]t ill becomes those living in the
Glass House . . . to throw stones at Mormon women.”171
But even the NWSA had its limits. By 1882, when Utah women’s
votes over a decade had not eradicated polygamy, the NWSA instructed
polygamous women not to attend the NWSA national convention and
banned them from speaking at the New York State Women’s Suffrage
Convention. 172 Anthony worried about the NWSA appearing to endorse
168

See ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE 64 (1975).

169

1THE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 260–61 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan
B. Anthony, & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., Source Book Press 1970) (1881).
170

IVERSEN, supra note 164, at 31.

171

Id. (quoting Matilda J. Gage, The Brand of the Slave, 3 NAT’L CITIZEN &
BALLOT BOX, Dec., 1878, at 2). Nineteenth century feminists also feuded over how to
respond to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1869, it defined “citizens” and “voters” as “male,” writing the term “male” into
the constitution for the first time. IVERSEN, supra note 164, at 23. NWSA leaders vigorously
opposed granting Black men the vote before all women, a view that scholars have viewed as
radical in comparison to the centrist or even conservative AWSA. Id. NWSA leaders Susan
B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton worked with African Americans and other White
women to form the Equal Rights Association in 1866 to seek the vote for Black men and all
women, and the NWSA aimed to reform marriage and gender more broadly in society. Id.
The AWSA, in contrast, pursued the more narrow goal of female suffrage. Id. However,
angry after the Fifteenth Amendment enfranchised Black men, but not any women, Anthony
acidly noted that educated white women were more entitled to vote than “the most ignorant
foreigner or slave from the plantations of the South.” 2 THE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE,
supra note 157, at 88.
172

IVERSEN, supra note 164, at 165.

2010]

Race Treason

331

polygamy, and when she, Stanton, and Gage wrote the Utah chapter of The
History of Woman Suffrage, they managed to chronicle the Mormon
women’s struggle against disenfranchisement without even mentioning
polygamy.173
Despite this range of nineteenth century Americans’ views of
polygamy, the most influential decision makers grounded federal
antipolygamy statutes and case law on the political and race treason of
Mormons in establishing a separatist theocracy. Having uncovered the
racial underpinnings of American polygamy law, the remainder of the
Article offers two theoretical frameworks to understand it.
III. TWO FRAMEWORKS FOR RETHINKING POLYGAMY LAW
Two theoretical frameworks help organize the cacophony of images
and words of the polygamy debates. This Part first applies Said’s concept of
Orientalism 174 to shed light on the role of racial status in the cartoons’
depictions of polygamous Mormons as racial and ethnic Others. Second, it
taps Sir Henry Maine’s famous observation in 1864—in between the first
and second federal statute to ban polygamy——that “the movement of the
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to
Contract.” 175 Together, Orientalism and status/contract tensions help
explain the complex role of white supremacy in polygamy law.
A. Orientalism
Said’s approach shows how, by equating Mormons with Chinese
Americans, “the same network of interests is brought to bear as in other
occasions when ‘the Orient’ is in question.”176 Though crafted to analyze
the “us/them” frameworks in colonialism, Orientalism, used cautiously,
offers a sophisticated way to interpret racist antipolygamy discourse in
173
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nineteenth century America.177 It integrates the political and racial treason
charges within a single rubric, bringing antipolygamy rhetoric under the
mantle of colonialism and white supremacy for its depiction of White
Mormons as racial throwbacks with supposedly “Oriental” characteristics
like primitivism, sensuality, and submissiveness to despotism.178 Using the
insights of Orientalism, one can use its premise that racial and national
groups are fundamentally different, and moreover that these essential
differences justify treating some groups (“them”) as essentially inferior than
others (“us”). “We” were White, Protestant, native born, and descended
from England and Northern Europe (but not Ireland). “They,” in contrast,
were Asian, African American, Native American, Catholic, and Irish. Over
and over, antipolygamy rhetoric portrayed Mormons in reference to what
Said calls these “essential aspects of the Orient”: despotism and
sensuality. 179 In short, Orientalism offers a shorthand for describing a
situation in which the Other gets racialized, and the racialized Other gets
put in its place.
In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court did just that by
equating polygamy with “Asiatic and African peoples,” then quoting
political scientist Francis Lieber’s link between polygamy and stationary
despotism.180 Lieber was among the country’s leading academics, having
written influential political science texts, and also a former slaveholder.181
In 1855, two decades before Reynolds, Lieber wrote an article in Putnam’s
Monthly using the first person singular, inviting his readers to frame the
question of Mormon citizenship in “us/them” terms:
Mormonism is one of those subjects in history which . . . make[s]
the beholder bend down with averted face and exclaim—“I, too
belong to this race!” The mischief which large crimes leave upon
177
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the whole race, is as great in its downward direction, as the
instances of noble individuals and nations are in their elevating
effects.182

Lest readers think Lieber meant “the human race” when he exclaimed, “I,
too belong to this race,” he clarified that he meant the “race” of European,
civilized White men:
Wedlock, or monogamic marriage . . . is one of the elementary
distinctions—historical and actual—between European and
Asiatic humanity. . . . It is one of the pre-existing conditions of
our existence as civilized white men, as much so as our being
moral entities is a pre-existing condition of the idea of law. . . .
Strike it out, and you destroy our very being; and when we say
our, we mean our race—a race which has its great and broad
destiny, a solemn aim in the great career of civilization, with
which no one of us has any right to trifle.183

While Lieber admitted that “[t]here have been a few exceptions to the
pervading monogamic spirit of our western Caucasian race,” 184 his
association of Whiteness with civilization and monogamy was all too clear.
The influence of this association increased when, a generation after Lieber
published this article, the Supreme Court in Reynolds transformed his view
into legal precedent by linking polygamy to purportedly backward “Asiatic
and African peoples” and to a primitive form of government, “stationary
despotism.”185
The Supreme Court’s tendency to associate polygamists with the
Orient, using us/them language, extended to other polygamy cases. In the
Late Corporation case, the Court upheld the Edmunds-Tucker Act that
directed the Attorney General to seize the Church’s property and begin
winding down its affairs. The Court referred to English people as “our own
ancestors” and emphasized the Asian-ness of polygamy by using two Indian
examples of practices that fall outside of the free exercise of religion:

182

Francis Lieber, The Mormons: Shall Utah be Admitted into the Union?, 5
PUTNAM’S MONTHLY 225, 233–34 (1855).
183

Id. (emphasis in original).

184

Id.

185

Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164, 165–66.

334

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

[Vol. 19:2

No doubt the Thugs of India imagined that their belief in the right
of assassination was a religious belief; but their thinking did not
make it so. The practice of suttee by Hindu widows may have
sprung from a supposed religious conviction. The offering of
human sacrifices by our own ancestors in Britain was no doubt
sanctioned by an equally conscientious impulse. But no one, on
that account, would hesitate to brand these practices, now, as
crimes against society, and obnoxious to condemnation and
punishment by the civil authority.186

The “Thugs of India,” like Mormon polygamists, captured the nineteenth
century public imagination in America and England. Thugs were reputed to
be devotees of Kali, the Hindu goddess of destruction, who roamed the
countryside robbing and murdering travelers, then offered spoils of the
crime as sacrifices to the goddess.187 The Court’s second example, Hindu
widows immolating themselves, similarly drew on associations between
Mormon polygamy and harm to women, as well as foreign, particularly
Asian, manifestations of Otherness.
B. Henry Maine’s Claim that Progressive Societies Move from Status to
Contract
To situate the polygamy debates within Henry Maine’s observation
that “the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a
movement from Status to Contract,”188 it helps to know what he meant by
“progressive,” “status,” and “contract.” Maine meant “progressive” in a
literal sense, meaning movement, contrasting it with “stationary,” barbaric
societies in China and India.189 By “status” he meant “Patriarchal Theory,”
positing it as the genesis of all known societies, in which fathers exercised
unqualified dominion over their wives, children, and slaves.190 Contract, in
186
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his view, replaced the rule of the family with the growth of “individual
obligation” in the West. He recognized however that, even in Western
Europe in the 1860s, women remained stuck in an “archaic jurisprudence . .
. retaining [them] in the bondage of the Family for life.” 191 Today,
progressives would wince at Maine’s use of “progressive” to denote
Western Europe, in contrast to barbaric and primitive “Hindoos” of India,192
since twenty-first century speakers use the term “progressive” to reflect
respect for individual rights and equality among citizens, regardless of
religion, ethnicity or sex.193 Yet classical liberalism, the philosophical home
of Henry Maine’s ideas about freedom of contract, can both support and
undermine equality.
Contractualism’s progressive pedigree includes reforms like the
Married Women’s Property Acts, and the gradual replacement of slavery
with wage labor, which capture “the evolution of individualism, the gradual
recognition of the legal personhood of wives, employees, citizens.” 194
However, it also has favored the haves at the expense of have-nots by
binding parties to standard-form contracts that, among other things, waive
employees’ rights to litigate civil rights claims and concede to jurisdiction
so far away that litigation becomes practically impossible. 195 The
status/contract dichotomy evidences similar complexity in the polygamy
debates.
Status and contract evade precise definition. However, the notion of
innate, hierarchal status underlies assertions by scientific racists like
Roberts Barthelow, Samuel Cartwright and C.G. Forshey equating
polygamy with backward and degenerate races. 196 Contract, representing
choice and equality, informed antipolygamists’ assertion that Mormon
191
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women were forced into plural marriage. But the cartoons show that
antipolygamists did not champion choice and equality for everyone.
Instead, the cartoons condemn the choice of interracial marriage, and the
equality it both presupposes and supports. Thus contract provides a way to
decode the otherwise puzzling miscegenation references in polygamy
cartoons.
Miscegenation anxiety played a central role in nineteenth century
white supremacy.197 After the Civil War, courts and legislatures defined,
and then redefined, the contours of Black Americans’ citizenship through
their decisions first to invalidate miscegenation law, and then to reinstate
it.198 As a whole, the cases show a brief step from status to contract and
quickly back again toward status.
In the wake of the Civil War, courts and legislatures in seven of the
eleven formerly confederate states invalidated or repealed their
miscegenation statutes.199 These courts reasoned that marriage was a civil
contract and that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth
Amendment protected African Americans’ right to contract on the same
basis as White citizens, rendering the miscegenation laws unenforceable. In
Burns v. State, for example, the Alabama Supreme Court held the state
miscegenation statute unconstitutional, reasoning that because marriage is a
civil contract, “[t]he same right to make a contract as is enjoyed by white
citizens means the right to make any contract which a white citizen may
make.” 200 But the triumph of contract over status in marriage was short
lived. Indiana led the retrenchment by upholding its miscegenation law in
State v. Gibson.201 The court began by reasoning that Blacks’ contractual
freedoms guaranteed by federal law extended only to the District of
Columbia and “other places where the federal government has exclusive
jurisdiction,” meaning territories and the unreconstructed South. 202 It
finished by rejecting freedom of contract as a rationale for overturning
miscegenation law, asserting that marriage, while contractual, was “more
than a mere civil contract”:
197
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In this State, marriage is treated as a civil contract, but it is more
than a mere civil contract. It is a public institution established by
God himself, is recognized in all Christian and civilized nations,
and is essential to the peace, happiness, and well-being of society
. . . . The right, in the states, to regulate and control, to guard,
protect, and preserve this God-given, civilizing, and
Christianizing institution is of inestimable importance, and
cannot be surrendered.203

Indiana, as a Northern state, could hardly be accused of trying to resurrect
slavery by so narrowly interpreting the post-Civil War Amendments and
legislation. Southern states embraced the Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis
as, one by one, they reinstated their miscegenation bans.204
When the Supreme Court sided with the opponents of so-called
“race mixing” in Pace v. Alabama, status triumphed over contract’s
temporary progress. 205 Bans on miscegenation remained, providing a
backbone of racial hierarchies until late into the twentieth century. 206 In
short, ideas of contractual freedom provided an intellectual framework for
allowing interracial marriage. But these ideals about choice and equality
were quickly stifled by status-based ideas about racial status, effectively
limiting full civic membership to Whites.
It is no coincidence that the country wrestled with the
miscegenation question and the Mormon question at the very same time, in
the decades after the Civil War. Supporters of polygamy, like those seeking
to overturn miscegenation laws, made contractual freedom arguments. As
with miscegenation, those contractual arguments lost out to status-based
ones. In 1859, three years before Congress passed its first antipolygamy
statute, John Stuart Mill, among the most prominent philosophers of his
day, devoted the last few pages of his classic text On Liberty to a
contractualist defense of plural marriage.207 Briefly put, Mill argued that the
State should leave people free to make choices, even bad choices, since the
State was no better situated, and often less able, than people to make those
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decisions for themselves. 208 While acknowledging the harm polygamy
could pose to women, he reasoned that interfering with Mormon women’s
choice would impose a greater tyranny:
[I]t is difficult to see on what principles but those of tyranny they
can be prevented from living there [in Utah] under what laws
they please, provided they commit no aggression on other
nations, and allow perfect freedom of departure to those who are
dissatisfied with their ways.209

Granted, Mill leaves room for debate. The extreme measures the federal
government took to force Mormons to abandon polygamy could well be
justified by the Mormons’ “aggression on other nations”—at least the
United States—and the Mormons’ refusal to “allow perfect freedom of
departure” for those who preferred monogamy.210
The slipperiness of status and contract may be due to the fact that
they are social constructs, and thus changeable. 211 But important
distinctions separate the two. Status is constructed to deny its social
construction, claiming instead to derive its substantive rules from an extrahuman source of authority—usually God, nature, or biology—rather than
human beings.212 Thus the Indiana Supreme Court could describe marriage
as “God-given . . . and Christianizing” at the very moment it imposed
human-made rules to define it as monoracial. 213 The court avoided
dismantling race hierarchy by viewing it as “God-Given,” and thus beyond
human authority, perhaps even beyond human understanding. Contract, in
208
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contrast, owns its social construction by deriving its authority from human
action. Thus Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s assertion that “if you regard
marriage as a civil contract, then let it be subject to the same laws which
control all other contracts.”214
In both miscegenation and polygamy debates, the status-based
construction of marriage as monogamous and mono-racial made important
contributions to the construction of citizenship as White. In each dispute,
contractual reasoning might have lead to a different—and more
progressive——result of allowing people to choose their spouses,
regardless of race, or in Mill’s words, to live in Utah “under what laws they
please, provided they commit no aggression on other nations, and allow
perfect freedom of departure to those who are dissatisfied with their
ways.”215 But status prevailed.
Using Henry Maine’s sense of “progressive” as moving forward,
and “status” as stationary, the resolution of contests over race and
numerosity in marriage pushed citizenship backward. Seen this way,
monogamists who charged polygamists with being throwbacks, and selfstyled “race purists” who viewed people of color as backward, were
themselves defending, and reinstating a primitive notion of citizenship
based on racial status.
This primitive defense of status played a key role in other
discussions of race and gender. Slaveholders invoked the Biblical story of
Noah cursing his son Ham to argue that Black Africans were descended
from Ham, and thus “originally designed to vassalage.” 216 William
Blackstone justified common law coverture rules with a Biblical passage,
asserting that man and woman are “one flesh” before God.217 By the late
twentieth century, contractualist opposition to both of these status-based
214
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COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430, 432 and Genesis 2:24 (RSV)).
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lines of argument ripened into doctrines allowing interracial marriage,
premarital contracting, and no-fault divorce. 218 But all along the way,
defenders of status resisted contractualism. In this framework, the
antipolygamy cartoons can be seen as yet another visceral defense of status.

1. Viscerally Defending Status to Ward off Private Ordering
Legal academics refer to the contractualism within Henry Maine’s
framework as “private ordering,” which honors individual choice and
produces more pluralism.219 The phrase “private ordering” as shorthand for
contractualism helps decode the pervasive disorderliness in antipolygamy
cartoons. They depict political disorder through despotism, racial disorder
through miscegenation, and domestic disorder through unmanageable ratios
of men to women and children, disrespect for parental authority, and
lasciviousness. The morality tale repeated ad nauseum in these cartoons
cautions against plurality and equality. Yet the complexity of how consent
(and thus contractualism) played out in polygamy debates offers its own
lesson about facile assertions that one form of marriage is more contractual
or status-oriented than the other.
Both polygamy and monogamy mixed status and contract, but in
different ways.220 Legal historian Sarah Gordon deftly maps convergences
between freedom of contract strains of antipolygamy, abolitionist, and
suffragist rhetoric. 221 In her view, nineteenth century Americans treated
consent as “both highly valued and tightly confined,” producing a “vapid”
notion of consent in antipolygamy rhetoric that merely triggered entry into
an authoritarian relationship, a far cry from “the individual will and
sovereignty that its defenders claimed to cherish.”222 Antipolygamists and
abolitionists, she explains, condemned the “twin relics” as nonconsensual:
218

See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d
106 (Cal. 1976); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 20–24 (1985); JOHN WITTE,
JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION AND THE LAW IN THE WESTERN
TRADITION 10–12 (1997).
219
See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3 (1992); IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE
(1988); ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1992).
220
The complexity of consent in marriage may well stem from classical
liberalism’s gendered notion of consent, in which men consented to governments, and
women consented to husbands. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988).
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Gordon, supra note 203, at 832–47.
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Id. at 832, 846–47.
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Marriage and wage labor—these were the essential private rights
that abolitionists subsumed under the “freedom of contract” label.
. . . These were the voluntary legal relations denied slaves.
Antipolygamists argued that the legal restrictions of slavery were
replicated for women in Utah. Like slaves, Mormon women were
denied the most important legal privileges, charged
antipolygamists; the tyranny of Mormon men undermined their
ability to contract valid marriages.223

Yet the domestic relations doctrines governing the monogamous marriages
that antipolygamists so staunchly defended remained steeped in statusbased reasoning.
The common law doctrine of coverture treated marriage as a status
into which women contracted.224 Once married, they lost their legal identity
under the theory that they became united in one person with their husband,
their husbands representing them in voting, entering contracts, and other
acts of civic membership.225 In this legal universe, spouses could divorce
only in extreme circumstances such as one person committing a crime like
adultery.226 Still, monogamy was beginning to evolve away from status and
toward contract through statutes like the Married Women’s Property
Acts.227
Contrary to antipolygamists’ condemnations of the lack of consent
inherent in polygamy, the legal doctrines governing polygamy actually
extended a measure of procedural freedoms of contract by relaxing
requirements for divorce. 228 In 1852, Utah passed the most permissive
223

Id. at 832.

224

BLACKSTONE, supra note 227, at 430.
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NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK (1982).
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Gordon, supra note 203, at 836.
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See, e.g., 1809 Ohio Laws 146.( “[A]nd every female person aged eighteen
years and upwards . . . shall have power . . . to devise all the estate, right, title . . . to lands . .
. .”).
228

Procedural aspects of contractual freedom concern entry and exit from the
relation, as opposed to substantive freedoms to determine the terms of a contract. See Arthur
Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 PENN L. REV.
485 (1967) for a discussion of procedural and substantive unconscionability. Mormons
themselves acknowledged the old-fashioned status-based elements of polygamy, calling it
the “Patriarchal Principle” to reflect their emulation of Old Testament patriarchs. GORDON,
supra note 16, at 3. For further discussion of Mormons’ assertions of themselves as superior
in status-based terms, see supra III.C.1.
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divorce statute in the entire country. 229 It allowed anyone who was “a
resident or wishes to become one” to obtain a divorce if “it shall be made to
appear to the satisfaction and conviction of the court, that the parties cannot
live in peace and union together, and that their welfare requires a
separation.”230 Most provocatively for present purposes, Gordon suggests
that Americans’ common tendency to speak of the government as a national
household meant that antipolygamists may well have viewed Utah’s lax
divorce statute as akin to the South’s threats to separate from the Union:
[I]t is . . . worth exploring the contours of consent in the era of
the Civil War, a war fought to preserve a union created by the
consent of the parties from dissolution when one party sought to
withdraw, arguing that it no longer consented to the marriage.
Unionists argued, and fought for, the proposition that a
constitution, like a marriage, was more than a compact formed
with the possibility of dissolution in view.231

This link between polygamy, divorce and secession reveals that monogamy
was more procedurally status-based than its proponents let on. Overall,
antipolygamists condemned plural marriage as overly contractual or overly
status-based, whichever made the Mormons look worse. Their arguments
succeeded in part because polygamy, like monogamy, was a mixed bag of
status and contract.
Doctrinally, Utah’s rule allowing free exit from marriage
represented procedural contractualism in marriage, since spouses could
leave (and presumably form another contract with a new spouse). The
divorce law reflected a certain moral neutrality toward various marriage
forms that reflected pluralist norms produced by contract-based thinking.232
But substantively, plural marriage was defined by the status-based version
of coverture that held sway in upstate New York in the 1830s when Joseph
Smith founded the religion, a view reinforced by Mormon leaders’
authoritarian control over the membership.233
229

Gordon, supra note 203, at 842.

230

Id.
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Id. at 838.

232

Mormon scripture expressed no such moral neutrality, mandating damnation
for women who refused to consent to their husbands taking a plural wife because they
opposed plural marriage. GORDON, supra note 16, at 96.
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The status-enforcing aspects of Mormon contractualism in marriage
become clear upon close examination of purported freedoms like the liberal
divorce statute. Utah lawmakers likely passed this statute to enable Mormon
converts to divorce their non-Mormon spouses and marry Mormons. 234
Moreover, liberal divorce may have represented freedom for husbands but
more constraints than ever on wives, because they had to obey dictates of
husband or Church or risk abandonment. As Brigham Young explained in
an 1856 sermon:
My wives have got to do one of two things—either round up their
shoulders and endure the afflictions of this world and live their
religion, or they may leave; for I will not have them about me. I
will go into heaven alone, rather than have scratching and
fighting around me. I will set all at liberty. What! first wife too?
Yes, I will liberate you all.235

Two incidents involving founding prophet Joseph Smith further
demonstrate the highly constrained “consent” in plural marriage.
Lucy Walker wrote that Mormon Prophet Joseph Smith told her in
1842 “I have a message for you. I have been commanded of God to take
another wife, and you are the woman.”236 He then asked if she believed him
to be “a prophet of God,” to which she assented, then he explained that
plural marriage would “prove an everlasting blessing.” 237 After
deliberating, she married him.238 Another incident involving Joseph Smith
shows that some Mormon women did not freely consent to plural marriage.
Obedience was so central to Mormon practice that refusal to enter a plural
marriage could be deemed traitorous to the Mormon project. When Joseph
Smith taught Mary Rollins Lighter about plural marriage, and she hesitated,
he asked her if she “was going to be a traitor.” 239 Perhaps reluctant to
betray the charismatic leader of her isolated community, she became a
plural wife.240
234

Gordon, supra note 203, at 842.

235

Id. at 835.

236

DAYNES, supra note 37, at 27.

237

Id.

238

Id. at 27–28.

239

Id. at 26–27 (emphasis in original).

240

Id.

344

Columbia Journal of Gender and Law

[Vol. 19:2

In short, the practice of nineteenth century monogamy offered
women a measure of procedural contractual freedom by choosing a mate
and substantive contractual freedom through statutory reforms like the
Married Women’s Property Acts. But overall, monogamous marriage
retained status-based doctrines by sharply restricting spouses’ freedom to
alter the substantive terms of the state-created marriage contract and
limiting access to divorce. Polygamy, in contrast, implemented a measure
of procedural contractualism by facilitating divorce, but similarly retained,
and perhaps strengthened, rigid status-based hierarchies that defined the
substance of marital, and perhaps other relationships.
The quantum of contract and status in monogamy and polygamy
can also be reversed. Monogamy becomes more status-oriented by virtue of
its immutability, which precludes “contracting” around it for another kind
of marriage (or contracting around mono-racial norms to form an interracial
marriage). Polygamy, in contrast, seems more contractual by presupposing
a “moral diversity”241 of marital options, and allowing Mormons to engage
in private ordering by “contracting” around the default rule of
monogamy. 242 While the status-based elements of polygamy may have
made for less equality within those marriages, this contractual rubric makes
for more equality among types of marriage. Doctrines governing
monogamy, in contrast, provided an increased measure of equality for
women within marriage over the course of the century, but less equality
among different types of intimate affiliation.
These themes found expression in best-selling antipolygamy
novels, often written by women, which likely influenced the ban on
Mormon polygamy:
For antipolygamy reformers, the most compelling proof of the
barbarism of both slavery and polygamy was the brutal
indifference both showed to marriage as the sanctification of a
woman’s powers of sexual consent. Just as the slave plantation
had been a deviant family, a seat of “fornication, adultery,

241

Sarah Barringer Gordon, “Our National Hearthstone”: Anti-Polygamy Fiction
and the Sentimental Campaign Against Moral Diversity in Antebellum America, 8 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 295, 300 (1996).
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If, however, Church mandate determines whether a person exercises this option
to “contract around” monogamy, it ceases to be contractual, except to the extent that a person
might “contract” out of mainstream Christianity and into Mormonism by converting.
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concubinage,” the family under polygamy, its critics charged,
was “white slavery.”243

Antipolygamists’ insistence that no sane White woman would ever consent
to plural marriage conflicted with many polygamist women’s insistence that
they willingly became polygamous wives, 244 and also with the
antipolygamists’ tolerance for the limited role of consent within monogamy.
As a matter of legal doctrine, marital rape was not recognized until a
century after the Reynolds case, because rape was defined as intercourse by
force and without consent, with a woman not the defendant’s wife. 245
Literary critic Nancy Bentley explains:
[F]emale consent represented a form of social legitimation that
had become both indispensable and problematic for the modern
nation-state. Indispensible because, as a model for social
relations, wifely consent could soften the constraints of law and
duty into the joys of love; problematic because the passivity of
wifely love made it an inherently equivocal model of political
agency.246
The social legitimization of women in the nation state was indeed
equivocal. When state legislatures passed Married Women’s Property Acts,
courts narrowly interpreted them to limit wives’ access to earnings.247 Just
seven years before deciding Reynolds, the Supreme Court upheld Illinois’
refusal to allow women to practice law, reasoning that wives could not hold
careers independent of their husbands.248
Perhaps this very tension, between monogamist women’s desires
for a greater measure of consent—and even individuality—in marriage, and
the very real constraints monogamy placed on both female consent and
243

Bentley, supra note 92, at 346 (quoting STANLEY, supra note 35, at 24).
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Id. at 346.
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The Model Penal Code still defines rape as forcible “sexual intercourse with a
woman not [the defendant’s] wife . . . .” MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1. See Robin West,
Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U. FLA.
L. REV. 45 (1990).
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individuality, fueled that branch of the antipolygamy movement. Bentley
suggests that in the face of their own all-too-seldom ideal domestic
arrangements, antipolygamist women could use Utah polygamy to “draw
off every historical and personal ambiguity of wifehood, estranging and
finally displacing those ambiguities onto the sins of an occidental Sodom, a
collection of “unbelievable crimes in a far off country.”249 If we drag our
disinherited selves behind us, nineteenth century antipolygamists could be
said to have dragged their disinherited notions of status in marriage behind
them, vehemently distinguishing their current selves from the very status
regimes they were slowly leaving behind.

2. Viewing Cartoons through a Lens of Status and Contract
This profound agnosticism about polygamy’s relationship to
gendered status arrangements also appears in cartoons. Some cartoons
decried polygamy as treating women like things. One cartoon published in
the Daily Graphic in the early 1880s depicts a Mormon polygamist as a
pirate with wives tied to his belt like so much booty.250

249
Bentley, supra note 92, at 352 (quoting ALVA MILTON KERR, TREAN, OR THE
MORMON’S DAUGHTER: A ROMANTIC STORY OF LIFE AMONG THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS 65
(1888)). James Baldwin discerned a similar pattern in mid-twentieth century racism. In his
view, White people project their darkest desires and most egregious flaws onto African
Americans, then cannot view them as fully human without giving up the fantasy of their own
purity and innocence. James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time, in BALDWIN: COLLECTED
ESSAYS 340-42 (ed. Toni Morrion 1998).
250
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Yet more is going on in the cartoon. In addition to conveying the disorder
of too much male power, the feather in his cap labeled “Mormonism” may
signal Native American resistance to Federal incursion, 251 as well as
Mormon propensities to savagery and even murder. 252 This theme of
251
Recall that Mormons collaborated with Indians to murder 127 travelers in the
Mountain Meadows Massacre in 1857. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
252

Id.
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political disorder carries over to the pirate’s dagger, labeled “defiance,”
bringing to mind the possibility of simultaneous fascination with the
romantic freedoms of piracy and condemnation of its social dangers.
Similarly, an 1882 cartoon in The Judge, titled “An Unsightly
Object,”253 mined the common view of polygamy and slavery as the “twin
relics of barbarism” by depicting polygamy like a slave auction in which
beleaguered White women wore numbers as if they were chattel for sale.

A closer look reveals many ideas beyond accusing polygamy of treating
women like things. Notice the fat polygamist’s defiance: he shakes his fist
253

note 16, at 3.

An Unsightly Object, THE JUDGE, Jan. 28, 1882, reprinted in GORDON, supra
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at the federal capitol building, and resembles the wild Irishman in the
cartoon titled “An Irish Jig” from Harpers discussed above.254 This cartoon,
“An Unsightly Object,” like “Uncle Sam’s Troublesome Bedfellows,” 255
argues for increased legal action against the Mormons. An ax labeled
“[President] Arthur’s Message” is embedded in the stump labeled
“polygamy,” but the men in top hats are milling around instead of paying
attention. Implicitly, words alone will not “hew down” the unsightly stump
of polygamy: federal force is needed.
The federal government eventually asserted enough force to win the
battle over Mormon polygamy. 256 However, what it was attacking and
defending remains open to debate. Sarah Gordon convincingly frames the
federal action against the Mormons as the second half of Reconstruction,
exercising new-found federal authority in Utah just as the North withdrew
from the South in the 1870s.257 Nancy Cott views it as one moment in the
construction of citizenship through marriage as White, monogamous, and
married. 258 A third view, proposed here, views citizenship is as status,
reinscribed with hierarchies of race and sex at the very moment after the
Civil War when both might have been radically altered. That alternation can
be described as contractual, grounded in ideals of equality, autonomy, and
pluralism. Two cartoons from the early twentieth century demonstrate this
underlying concern that polygamy could empower women and people of
color.
A 1904 cartoon in New York World, captioned “There are
Influences Greater than the Government in Utah,”259 echoes the old joke of
one wizened old polygamist dominated by numerous wives, 260 and also
brings to mind public events of the early twentieth century in which women
sought the vote.
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The cartoon may well have meant to depict polygamy as an institution so
strong it could overpower the state ban on it. Additionally suggested are the
dangers posed by powerful women seeking public rights. Utah had granted
women the vote in 1870, before Congress disenfranchised Utah women
through the Edmunds Tucker Act in 1887.261 An 1899 article in the AfroAmerican charged feminists, proponents of free-love, and polygamists with
waging war “against the marriage institution.” 262 By 1904, Utah women
had been voting for a decade, by virtue of new state’s constitution, which
had restored female suffrage. 263 New York, presumably home to most
readers of the New York World, was much more hostile to women voting
than Utah, withholding suffrage from women until 1917.264
Viewing the cartoon through the lens of women’s rights is revealing.
The first wife, who is labeled “No. 1” on the left, holds a pocketbook. If she
also holds a job at a factory in one of the newly industrialized cities, most
states would allow her to control her own earnings. On the right, and
261

See supra note 26.
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263
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equally formidable, is a bespectacled matron holding an umbrella. She
looks ready to read, ready for rain, and ready to take to the streets for
woman suffrage. In the background is a single ugly woman with bug eyes,
repeating the old saw about ugly women and polygamy. As a whole, the
cartoon seems to mourn the loss of some status-based hierarchies in
marriage, and long for the day where one man might assert his rightful
place of head of household, without worrying about his wife (or wives)
wielding economic, political, or social power.
A year later, in 1905, sheet music for a song titled The Mormon
Coon, similarly used polygamy to ridicule changes to status-based
arrangements, this time along race lines.265

265

The Mormon Coon, 1905, reprinted in BUNKER & BITTON, supra note 78, at 89.
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The image on the sheet music cover brings to mind the Supreme Court’s
language in Reynolds associating polygamy with both despotism and
“Asiatic and African peoples.” 266 Unlike most nineteenth century satiric
portrayals of polygamists, in which one wife or child might be Black, this
image portrays the polygamist man himself as Black. But he is also Asianlooking, with almond shaped eyes and a long, silky-looking white beard and
mustache. As in earlier cartoons, he is surrounded by his many wives, one
Asian, a few Anglos, one unattractive woman, and the easily recognized
mammy figure waving on the far right. The “Mormon Coon” sits
imperiously on his throne, governing his numerous and diverse family. The
core jibe is that he may even govern the state. The lyrics begin with usual
joking reference to numerosity and racial mixing, adding in the old gem
about ugly plural wives:
I’m out in Utah, in the Mormon land,
And going to stay, because I’m living grand,
I used to rave about a single life,
Now every day I get a brand new wife.
I’ve got a big brunette, And a blonde to pet,
I’ve got ‘em short, fat, thin and tall,
I’ve got a Cuban gal, and a Zulu pal,
They come in bunches when I call
And that’s not all—I’ve got ‘em pretty too
Got a homely few,
I’ve got ‘em black to octoroon,
I can spare six or eight, Shall I ship ‘em by freight?
For I am the Mormon coon.267

As the song progresses, it ridicules Black political and economic citizenship
as well as intelligence:
Next fall they’ll make me Gov’nor of the State;
The Parsons give me commutation rate;
I wish for every wife I had a cent,
Why, just for photographs, a house I could rent.
I’ve got so many, I forget a lot,
I keep the marriage license door hot,

266

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).

267
RAYMOND A. BROWNE & HENRY CLAY SMITH, THE MORMON COON (Sol Bloom
1905) (copy on file with author).
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If on the street into a wife I run,
I have to ask her, “What’s your number, Hon?268

This music likely milked the renewed interest in Mormon polygamy due to
the drawn-out hearings then occurring over Mormon Reed Smoot’s Senate
seat. 269 Yet the oft-repeated jabs at numerosity, racial and national
diversity, adding ridicule for Black political power, suggest that the cartoon
mined deeper territory. The persistence of these claims suggests they
formed a foundation for the ban on polygamy, leaving us to ask, a century
later, what currently justifies polygamy law. Most important is whether we,
like our nineteenth century predecessors, continue to carry concerns about
foreignness, barbarism, and racial degeneration, still embedded deep inside
polygamy law.
The Mormon Coon, like other cartoons and the language of
Reynolds asserting that polygamous societies “fetter[] the people in
stationary despotism” 270 explicitly linked race hierarchy to monogamy.
Requiring monogamous marriage within citizens’ households, while
facially neutral, was deeply raced.271 Slaves could not marry and patterns of
intimacy in slave communities included a range of affiliations, including
marriage, “taking up,” and “sweethearting,” that structured enslaved
people’s lives. 272 In American Apartheid, marriage has often defined

268
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their rights as Frenchmen.” Id. The first question was “Are the Jews permitted to have more
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11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251 (1999); Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American
History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 405 (2005).
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citizenship, and Whiteness (actual or perceived) has often determined
whose marriage counted.273
Re-reading Reynolds in this light invites us to rethink our knee-jerk
opposition to polygamy. The historian David Halperin observed that some
messages are so common that they don’t even have to be delivered, only
activated.274 Think of stereotypes such as gay male pedophiles or thieving
welfare queens. These implicit designations of “us” as better than “them”
determine the outcome from the outset: people-designated “problems” must
be subjected. This pattern played out in Reynolds’ case. On appeal from the
trial court, the Utah Supreme Court upheld Reynolds’ conviction,
summarily rejecting religious freedom claims as “based upon neither
reason, justice, nor law.” 275 On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court,
Reynolds’ attorneys filed a sixty-three page brief making extensive
religious freedom arguments.276 The government’s brief, in contrast, was
only eight pages long, explicitly declining to address the religion claim by
asserting that it did not “call for any remark.” 277 The Supreme Court’s
unanimously upheld Reynolds’ bigamy conviction.278
But the untold story of race and American polygamy law does call
for remark by those who think that legal doctrine needs better justification
than racialized assertions that “we” are better than “them.” This Article
concludes with a brief précis of how Americans could reexamine the ban.
IV. THREE QUESTIONS FOR RETHINKING POLYGAMY
Three questions help us rethink the polygamy ban. First, even if the
ban is rooted in white supremacy, why rethink a ban that is rarely enforced
and affects only eccentric religious sects in remote areas? Second, do we
still associate plural marriage with barbarism, foreignness, and people of
color? Third and finally, is it a coincidence that the plain language of the
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Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) bans both polygamy and same-sex
marriage?
The first question invites us to examine the expressive function of
banning polygamy, since that reveals what kind of State we inhabit. Even
though polygamy prosecutions are rare, they can involve hundreds of
people, and, more importantly, engage thousands or even millions of
Americans who avidly follow polygamy cases today, much as their
predecessors did fifty years ago. The 2008 Texas raid on the Yearning for
Zion ranch, for example, summarily separated over 400 children from their
parents based on an anonymous phone call that turned out to be a hoax.279
Following and debating the case became a national pastime, facilitated no
doubt by the popular TV show about polygamists, Big Love.280 Moreover,
banning polygamy matters because the ban continues to play a role in
immigration law.
Not coincidentally, that body of law plays a crucial role in defining
boundaries between people who are deemed worthy of American
citizenship, and those who are not. These immigration cases help answer
the second question about whether the racial roots of polygamy doctrine
continue to inform the application of today’s ban. In substance and spirit,
immigration law echoes nineteenth century discourse that framed polygamy
as “barbaric,” literally meaning “foreign.”281 While racial discourse usually
is more subtle than it was a century ago, immigration case law as recent as
1954 explicitly analogized polygamy to miscegenation.282
White supremacy has driven both polygamy doctrine and
immigration restrictions from the outset. In 1874, Congress passed its
second antipolygamy statute (the Poland Act), and the next year its first
immigration restriction, the Page Act, which excluded Chinese contract
laborers and prostitutes.283 While formally aimed at prostitution, it affected
more Chinese polygamous wives. Immigration officials mistook many
Chinese polygamous wives and concubines for prostitutes, out of ignorance
279
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or disregard for Chinese families that included first wives (often left with
the husband’s family in China), second wives, and concubines. 284 One
Senator at the time condemned Chinese polygamy in language almost
identical to anti-Mormon discourse. He claimed polygamy was “natural” for
Asians and Blacks,285 in “us/them” language, describing “the Mongol race”
as a “people to whom polygamy is as natural as monogamy is with us.”286
Just as antipolygamists dubbed slavery and polygamy the “twin relics of
barbarism,”287 proponents of Chinese exclusion used slavery to justify that
policy. As Kerry Abrams explains, “[c]oolies and citizens were antithetical:
A person willing to submit him or herself to a system of slavery could not
adequately participate in a democracy.”288
The intertwined racial roots of immigration and polygamy still
inform immigration law. Case law continues to ban polygamist wives from
immigrating, even when the first marriage was ended through death or
divorce.289 Just as the 1882 Edmunds Act barred jurors on the grounds of
belief in polygamy,290 federal immigration law excluded “[a]liens who are
polygamists or who practice polygamy or advocate the practice of
polygamy” until 1990.291 Although the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1990 narrowed the ban, barring only “practicing polygamists” from entering
the United States, 292 a 2007 decision applied the old rule, excluding a
woman from Yemen even though the death of the other wife meant that she
was no longer a “practicing polygamist.”293 The 2007 decision’s citation of
a 1962 case for the seemingly neutral proposition that “there is a strong
284
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federal policy against polygamy in this United States,” 294 imports to this
twenty-first century case the long-standing view of polygamy as foreign,
barbaric, and un-Christian. The 1962 case explicitly articulated racial
grounds for distinguishing “this United States” with non-Christian nations,
withholding a polygamous wife’s visa because “Anglo-American writers . .
. emphatically” refuse to recognize a polygamous marriage, and further
“such a marriage is not a marriage as understood among Christian
nations.”295 Just eight years earlier, in 1954, the year of Brown v. Board of
Education, and seventeen years before the Court would strike down bans on
miscegenation, 296 an immigration judge explicitly linked polygamy and
miscegenation, reasoning that while these practices might be “legitimate” in
“foreign jurisdictions,” such instances of “moral turpitude” remained
“contrary to the public policy of the United States.” 297 The immigration
ban, however, has more nuance than nineteenth century polygamy doctrine.
Immigration case law recognizes some polygamous family relationships by
sometimes treating children of one polygamous wife as stepchildren of
another wife.298 In sum, immigration law has inherited a good measure of
the nineteenth century reasoning that polygamy, though perhaps appropriate
for “Asiatic and African” peoples, was inappropriate for a White America.
The third and final question, interrogating the link between the twin
bans on polygamy and same-sex marriage, reveals a powerful and largely
unnoticed connection between the two bans. DOMA’s supporters raised
status-based arguments to ban same-sex marriage that eerily echo
nineteenth century concerns about polygamy fostering chaotic households
and feral relationships that threaten civilization.
294
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That parallel appears most obviously in the very language of
DOMA. DOMA explicitly incorporates the ban on polygamy by dictating
that, for federal purposes, “the word “marriage” means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife.”299 Drafters could
have said “a man and a woman,” but used “one” instead. A fundamental
canon of statutory construction dictates that legislatures say what they mean
and do not use words unnecessarily. 300 On its face, DOMA defends
monogamy as well as heterosexuality.
Opponents of same-sex marriage reinforce DOMA’s application to
what might be called the “twin challenges” to monogamous, heterosexual
marriage. Opponents cite antipolygamy precedent and tar same-sex
relationships as feral, barbaric, and fundamentally uncivilized. In a recent
case upholding DOMA, Andersen v. King County, 301 Judge Johnson’s
concurring opinion for the Washington Supreme Court thoroughly develops
the parallel between the polygamy ban and DOMA. First, Judge Johnson
linked government and marital forms by quoting the 1885 polygamy case
Murphy v. Ramsey:302
[N]o legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary
in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth . . . than
that which seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea of the
family, as consisting in and springing from the union for life of
one man and one woman.303

Situating monogamous marriage as central to Western democracy frames
alternatives like same-sex marriage as uncivilized, even barbaric. This
claim runs throughout DOMA’s legislative history, often appearing via
quotes of the same language from Murphy v. Ramsey.
299
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A House Report on DOMA also quoted the full “free, selfgoverning commonwealth” quote from Murphy, 304 as did Senator Coats’
defense of DOMA.305 Elaborating on the Murphy quote, Coats claimed that
monogamous, heterosexual marriage “civilizes our society by humanizing
our lives,” implicating alternatives like polygamous and gay unions as
outside civilization and even less than fully human:
Marriage is the institution in our society that civilizes our society
by humanizing our lives. It is the social, legal and spiritual
relationship that prepares the next generation for duties and
opportunities.306

Coats’ reference to gay people being unfit to raise the next generation
echoes the antipolygamist cartoons depicting chaotic polygamous
households and racial degeneration through multiracial children. He made
no apology for embracing a nineteenth-century view of marriage, asserting,
after quoting Murphy, “I don’t think anything has changed that would
change that definition given by the Supreme Court more than a hundred
years ago.”307
Indeed, Coats embraced a status-based view that Elizabeth Cady
Stanton and others condemned as outdated in 1860.308 He claimed divine
authority for his views, just as the Supreme Court of his state, Indiana, did a
century earlier to uphold miscegenation bans in Gibson.309 Coats asserted:
The definition of marriage is not created by politicians and
judges, and it cannot be changed by them. It is rooted . . . in our
nature as human beings. It is the union of one man and one
woman. This fact can be respected, or it can be resented, but it
cannot be altered.310
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Coats was hardly alone in grounding DOMA on status-based views of
marriage that had not, and indeed could not, change.
Representative Charles Canady, as Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution, opened the House
Judiciary hearings on DOMA by declaring: “[T]he traditional family
structure—centered on a lawful union between one man and one woman—
comports with nature and with our Judeo-Christian moral tradition. It is one
of the essential foundations on which our civilization is
based.” 311 “Barbaric” literally means “foreign” and “barbarism” denotes
behaving or speaking like a foreigner.312 In this view, “civilization,” is a
term that carries highly racialized freight. Once self-styled “defenders” of
heterosexual marriage claim exclusive access to civilization, race and
ethnicity quickly come to the fore. Anti-gay marriage crusader Maggie
Gallagher echoed this theme when she worried that industrialized nations
are not reproducing enough to replace existing populations, making those
societies vulnerable to take-over by outsiders.313 Recall the cartoon images
reproduced above that depicted Turks, Irish, Scottish, Japanese, and
Chinese figures as embodying the threat that Mormon polygamy posed to
civilization by jeopardizing white supremacy.314 Recall too Francis Lieber
and the Supreme Court’s use of the first-person pronouns—“I” and “our”—
to contrast with “Asiatic and African peoples,” 315 to designate them as
“them” and “Other” in their barbaric, foreign backwardness. In short,
nineteenth century antipolygamists and twenty-first century opponents of
same-sex marriage took their language and arguments from the same page
from the Status-is-Determinative playbook.
Amherst Professor Hadley Arkes, speaking for the academy in the
DOMA deliberations, also sounded as if he were speaking a century ago.
He shared a teleological approach with Lieber and Barthelow, who vilified
311
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Mormon polygamy for violating the natural law by forming primitive
marriages fit only for primitive races. 316 Arkes, for his part, asserted a
natural teleology of human intimacy that echoed nineteenth century
assertions about a natural progression of civilization away from the
primitive East and toward the civilized West, as natural and unalterable as
the sun’s progress through the sky. Arkes testified to the “natural teleology
of the body” 317 that makes heterosexuals inherently superiority to gay
people. Like his predecessors, he pilloried his target by comparing them to
another unpopular group:
If the law permitted the marriage of people of the same sex, what
is the ground of principle then on which the law would rule out as
illegitimate the people who profess that their own love is not
confined to a coupling of two, but connected in a larger cluster of
three or four? . . . [W]e would be back, in principle, to the
acceptance of polygamy. And while we are at it, we might ask
how the law, on these new premises, rules out marriage between
parents and their grown children.318

Arkes’ explicitly recognized the status-based foundation for his argument,
naming it “nature,” and charged same sex marriage supporters with
advocating a contract model of marriage. In doing so he claimed a fixed
status for men and women (and therefore gays and heterosexuals),
contrasting natural law to human-made positive law:
[G]ay activists . . . have the most profound interest, rooted in the
logic of their doctrine, in discrediting the notion that marriage
finds its defining ground in “nature” . . . . In this construction,
marriage does become a matter solely of convention and opinion,
and therefore it can be given virtually any shape by the positive
law.319
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In this light, the anti-gay “defense” of marriage is revealed, at its core, to
defend status over contract, just like antipolygamy discourse of a century
earlier.
Rather than allow adults to “contract” for the type of marriage that
suits them, inheritors to the racial arguments against plural marriage
proceed from a similar status-based premise that heterosexual marriage is
dictated by nature, biology, or God (and thus not subject to human
alteration). This “natural teleology of the body,” 320 in Arkes phrasing,
therefore, must mean that husbands and wives perform standard and
complementary roles. In this system, the “one man and one woman”
language mandates that one spouse will be the man, and the other will be
the woman.
Arkes is no outlier. New York upheld the ban on same-sex marriage
on these grounds, invoking status by calling it “intuition and experience,”
instead of nature or God.321 Without specifying the genesis or nature of the
intuition or experience, the court reasoned “that a child benefits from
having before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what both a man
and a woman are like.”322 Similarly, philosopher John Finnis grounded his
opposition to same-sex marriage on a premise of fixed, biological
complementarity between men and women:
The union of the reproductive organs of husband and wife really
unites them biologically . . . in respect of that function, the
spouses are indeed one reality . . . . But the common good of
friends who are not and cannot be married (for example, man and
man, man and boy, woman and woman) has nothing to do with
their having children by each other, and their reproductive organs
cannot make them a biological (and therefore personal) unit.323
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These arguments from status carry important consequences.
Coverture was grounded in ideas about the status of women as
inherently inferior and needing their husbands’ control and protection,
justifying the status of the married couple as one legal person, whose
interests were represented by the husband. Finnis, Arkes, Coates, and the
highest courts of New York and Washington, share a status-based view of
both gender and marriage that, logically extended, could lead to reinstating
coverture, banning women from engaging in wage labor, voting, or keeping
their maiden names. Assuming that we do not want, as a country, to move
backward to nineteenth century understandings of gender, race, and
marriage, and further assuming that we retain the twin bans on same-sex
marriage and polygamy, we must update the rationale for both.
This Article stops short of articulating that new rationale. Instead,
relying on Henry Maine, it suggests that contract, generally, can improve on
the status-based reasoning that brought us miscegenation laws, The Mormon
Coon, and DOMA. A contractual view of marriage would allow adults to
consent to different types of marriage.
This approach rides the horse in the direction it seems to be headed.
The larger culture may well be puzzling out the benefits and dangers of
status and contract in lively discussions about polygamous Mormons while
watching Big Love or reading news about the raid on the Yearning for Zion
ranch. It is hard to imagine why else polygamists would once again attract
national attention, since the eccentric religious sects remain technologically,
geographically, and socially isolated in remote western compounds. Perhaps
polygamists represent, in the public imagination, extremes of both status
and contractualization in families. Families, the core of status for Henry
Maine, can now be contractualized more than ever through doctrines
governing reproductive technologies, no-fault divorce, and marital
contracting.324 As this Article details, status won in the nineteenth century
324
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assault on Mormon polygamists. But the outcome of this round remains to
be seen, where arguments once again pit status against contractually-based
expansions of marriage.325
This Article concludes on a cautionary note, noting the imperfect
match when nineteenth century polygamy disputes are mapped onto today’s
same-sex marriage debate. Just as contract and status played complex roles
in polygamy and monogamy a century ago, today’s debates on same-sex
marriage and polygamy elude reductionist description in status and contract
terms. On its face, both the federal antipolygamy statutes and modern
DOMAs define marriage as one man and one woman.326 Yet they differ in
the level of punishment for those who depart from the rule, reflecting a
gradual move toward contractualization even in DOMA’s status regime.
The federal DOMA defines marriage as one man and one woman and
allows a state opposing same-sex marriage to refuse to recognize a samesex marriage performed in a sister state, a much milder provision than the
federal antipolygamy statutes that criminalized bigamy and stripped
polygamists of citizenship through measures like disenfranchisement. 327
Returning to Henry Maine’s framework, we might see this difference
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 122 (Martha M. Ertman &
Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
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between the polygamy and DOMA legislation as a move toward
contractualism by increasingly tolerating people’s different choices in
family formation, even if remnants of status remain in the federal definition
of marriage.328
V. CONCLUSION
Polygamy has a complex history, linked to America’s history of
invidious hierarchies based on race and sex. Reynolds v. United States and
other cases upholding the criminalization of Mormon polygamy in the
nineteenth century reasoned that polygamy could be banned due to its
association with “African and Asian peoples” and “stationary despotism.”329
Judicial, medical and political discourse as well as cartoons of the day show
that most Americans worried at least as much about Mormon treason in
establishing a separatist theocracy as about plural marriage per se.
Moreover, mainstream opposition to Mormon control of Utah stemmed
from a widespread view that polygamy, while “natural,” among the
“inferior colored races,” was so “unnatural”330 for Whites that the progeny
of Mormons constituted a new species that resembled those supposedly
backward races, degenerating the White race and undermining white
supremacy. African American commentators, unsurprisingly, did not
articulate race degeneration arguments, opting instead to oppose polygamy
as akin to slavery, both defended with Biblical and states’ rights arguments.
Feminists, for their part, waffled about Utah granting women the vote and
whether to deploy polygamy’s mistreatment of women to reveal
monogamy’s abuses, but ultimately came to oppose polygamy. Even if
marginalized groups had different reasons for opposing polygamy, the
legal, political, and medical elites who shaped the legal doctrines grounded
their decision on racial status. Consequently, we should read American
antipolygamy law in light of their intent to remedy political and race
treason.
Two theoretical frameworks help decode the racial underpinnings
of American polygamy law. The concept of Orientalism helps explain the
political and cultural impact of depicting overwhelmingly White Mormons
328
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before the advent of Social Security and other federal benefits that now accompany
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as Asians and Black in cartoons, setting up a discourse in which a subject
people inevitably suffer subjugation. Moreover, Henry Maine’s 1864
assertion that progressive societies move “from status to contract”331 invites
us to view the cartoons as visceral defenses of status in the face of
encroaching contractualism in the late nineteenth century. Still, status and
contract offer only partial clarity. Both sides of the polygamy debates
asserted both contractual and status-oriented arguments. When
antipolygamists deprived White Mormons of citizenship rights like voting
to punish their race treason, it simultaneously furthered and undermined
white supremacy. By revealing Whiteness as an insider status that was so
clubby as to exclude even some White people (like Mormons, Irish, and
Italians), 332 racist antipolygamists unwittingly provided the tools to
dismantle the very system they sought to protect. If Whites are made
instead of born, purportedly natural categories are mere cultural constructs.
Deprived its status-based foundation, the claim that Whites naturally
practice monogamy, while “Asiatic and African peoples” are naturally
polygamous, is literal nonsense.
If status cannot justify antipolygamy law, we must search for an
alternative justification, should we decide to retain the doctrine. Besides
cleaning out this doctrinal closet of century-old dust bunnies, this process
could well clarify our thinking about marriage more generally and point the
way toward resolving the same-sex marriage debate.
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